To read a shorter article about reforming the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, visit our blog:
http://www.amitai-notes.com/blog/archives/001226.html#more

Regular items on nuclear terrorism can be found at:
http://www.amitai-notes.com/blog/archives/cat_nuclear_terrorism_update.html

Please email us your comments: aeblog@gwu.edu

Executive Summary

The main danger that many nations face in the near future is a nuclear
attack by terrorists. Attempts to defend against it by hardening domestic
targets will not work, nor can one rely on pre-emption by taking the war
to the terrorists before they attack. Hence, there is an urgent need to
limit greatly the damage that terrorists will cause by curbing their
access to nuclear arms and the material from which they can be made.
Focusing our energy on intercepting car and shoe-bombers will save less
lives than ensuring that terrorist groups will not lay waste to a whole
city. Preventing nuclear terrorism, the much neglected third front, should
be accorded first priority. Suggesting that we should advance full
throttle on all three fronts of homeland protection simultaneously will
lead to boundary busting, loss of prioritization, and ultimately to a
sense that we face a task that cannot be carried out. In the near future,
curbing terrorism requires turning from problem-solving to damage control.
In other words, we must recognize that we will be unable to stop all
attacks; thus, we must ensure that terrorists will not be able to strike
with weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

We must focus not on terrorism per se but on nuclear terrorism. We should
stop referring to WMD as if they were all of one kind; the main danger
comes from nuclear arms and a few biological agents. Chemical attacks and
most biological weapons, as well as dirty bombs, should be treated as a
lesser priority. Here too, boundary busting (defining the mission too
broadly) will make the task too onerous and cause a loss of focus.

More attention should be paid to failed and failing states (in which the
government does not effectively control nuclear arms or the material from
which they can be made). We should pay less mind to rogue states such as
North Korea and Iran. Each failing state is like hundreds of actors with
too wide a variety of motives and too low a visibility for them to be
easily deterred. On the other hand, rogue states--which have singular and
effective governments--might be deterred. Therefore, failing states are a
much more likely source of nuclear materials and arms than are rogue
states.

The current foreign policy focus on the Axis of Evil by the United States
and its allies is very much misplaced. Russia--the failing state of
greatest concern--should be treated often as part of the problem and only
rarely as part of the solution. Pakistan is another example of a troubling
failing state. In addition, the material from which nuclear bombs can be
made is found in the reactors, pools, and vaults of at least twenty other
failing states. These nations should be incentivized, pressured, and if
all else fails treated with "all available means" to blend down, trade in,
or otherwise eliminate these materials. Most immediately, the United
Nations should stop authorizing the building of new reactors with HEU, as
China has just done in Nigeria.

Beyond details, there must be a strategic shift from controlled
maintenance, the basic concept that underlines the Nuclear
Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), to deproliferation--from a license to keep
nuclear arms and fissile materials under various conditions such as
submitting to inspections, towards a policy that seeks the removal of
these dangerous items in one way or another. This is akin to the
difference between gun registration and removing guns from private hands.

This pre-9/11 conception of controlled maintenance must be replaced by one
of deproliferation, which ultimately aims to:

A) Upgrade security at facilities that store nuclear arms and fissile
materials as a temporary measure rather than as part of a lasting
solution. The reason I say temporary and in general emphasize upgraded
security much less than do other analysts, although I recognize its
importance, is because in my view, the best security removes the items
from the reach of those from which they are to be secure. To put it in
plain English, rather than upgrading security in facilities in failing
states, fissile material, and when possible nuclear arms, should be
expatriated, blended down, or converted. Security is inherently
unreliable, especially in failing states.

B) Expatriate fissile materials to safe havens and blend them down in
these havens rather than doing so on location. Replace all HEU with LEU,
which in effect cannot be used in making bombs, or with other sources of
energy. Furthermore, HEU replacement could be accomplished by providing
incentives such as large-scale foreign investment or foreign aid.

C) Prevent the transnational trade and transportation of nuclear bombs and
the materials from which they can be made.

D) Compel both failing states and rogue states (and in the longer run
still other states) that have nuclear bombs to destroy them. (This in turn
may require, in some cases where there is a great imbalance in
conventional forces, for the international community to guarantee the
country's borders.)

E) Prevent the construction of new facilities that use HEU, rather than
condone them as legal and legitimate (as is currently done under the NPT).

Pre-empting nuclear terrorism through deproliferation is not just a
vision. In effect, several steps in the right direction have already been
taken--albeit on a case by case basis and not as part of a general
strategy. However, these steps have been accorded few resources and low
priority. The opposite allocation of resources and attention is called
for.

We need a form of triage that asks: From which dangers must we first be
saved; which treatments may be delayed if delay we must; and so on. As
mentioned above, failing states ought to get priority over rogue states.
Among failing states, Russia and Pakistan are the most in need of repair.
Reactors, pools, and vaults in more than 20 nations, such as Indonesia and
Ghana, rank next among failing states. Among rogue states, Iran should be
treated in the opposite manner from how North Korea is treated: Iran
should be defanged urgently. In contrast, North Korea may well have to be
made the last member of the nuclear club. Removal of HEU should be ranked
higher than removal of plutonium, and the removal of plutonium should be
ranked higher than the removal of spent fuel.

Deproliferation fits well into an evolving new global architecture, which
I call the Global Safety Authority (GSA). It was formed by the United
States and its allies, working with most states of the world, to fight
terrorism. It has many governmental features; it is often coercive
although not without legitimacy as it has the approval of the United
Nations and NATO--in sharp contrast to the invasion of Iraq. This global
governmental agency is and ought to be expanded so that it can take the
lead in bringing about deproliferation. First, all peaceful means must be
exhausted, so that deproliferation will contribute to rather than
undermine the development of global law and legitimate worldwide
institutions. However, if soft power fails, in this area especially, the
application of hard power is called for. Deproliferation may well have to
be quite muscular. However, the more that nations give up their nuclear
ambitions and wherewithal, the stronger the taboo against proliferation
will become, requiring less of an enforcement regime and making the world
safer for one and all.

-Amitai Etzioni