In his first interview as Chief of the General Staff,
                    Gen Sir Mike Jackson talks to Dominic Lawson and
                    Sean Rayment as British troops prepare for battle
                    - and the challenges of peace-keeping - in Iraq

                    General Sir Mike Jackson - he insists on Mike rather than
                    Michael - is one of Britain's most charismatic and popular
                    post-war military commanders. In 1999, he was
                    acclaimed internationally for his handling of the Kosovo
                    crisis when he commanded the Nato peace-keeping force
                    (for which he was awarded the Distinguished Service
                    Order by the Queen). Three weeks ago, he became the
                    most senior soldier in the British Army when he was
                    appointed Chief of the General Staff.

                    Gen Jackson, who is a fluent speaker of Russian and
                    served in the Intelligence Corps before transferring to the
                    Parachute Regiment, is reputed to have the best mind in
                    the British Army. He has been known affectionately to
                    many of those serving under his command as the Prince
                    of Darkness as well as the Hero of Kosovo, although it is
                    said that he dislikes both titles.

                    Last week, speaking from his oak-panelled seat of power
                    inside the Old War Office, the 59-year-old Gen Jackson,
                    resplendent in his service dress emblazoned with three
                    rows of medal ribbons, gave his first interview as Chief of
                    the General Staff to The Telegraph.

                    The Telegraph: What are your overriding feelings
                    on taking on the job as Chief of the General Staff?

                    Sir Mike Jackson: Well, first of all, 40 years ago, little did
                    officer cadet Jackson think he'd finish up here, so its a
                    huge honour to be asked to be the professional head of
                    the Army. I'm conscious of the Army as a living thing,
                    which it very much is, and what I want to do is to ensure
                    over my time that the Army's capabilities, its people, the
                    way it approaches things, its ethos is retained and built
                    upon. It's very precious in my view, what we have, but
                    I'm determined to improve it.

                    Q: How do you think it can be improved?

                    MJ: There are a lot of aspects to this but I must start with
                    people. Generals and armies are nothing without their
                    soldiers, that's where it all starts from. It's getting those
                    soldiers the best deal I can in every way, whether that be
                    in their equipment, their pay, their living conditions. The
                    sense that they have an individual and vital part in what
                    this Army gets up to, that they have joined something
                    which is very special, that their contribution to the whole
                    is just as important as anybody else's.

                    Q: Is the Army suffering from "overstretch" as a
                    number of retired generals and opposition
                    politicians have indicated?

                    MJ: Without doubt the Army is very busy. Not least
                    because of our requirement, stood down for the moment
                    but still extant, along with the RAF and the Royal Navy, to
                    provide fire cover while the present dispute with the Fire
                    Brigades' Union works itself out. That's 13,000 odd
                    soldiers, which makes it very difficult to use them for
                    anything else. We have, of course, the build up for the
                    Gulf, we have the continuing commitment in Northern
                    Ireland, the Balkans and so on.

                    But my experience is that bored soldiers are not what we
                    want. Soldiers join the Army to go on operations, they
                    don't join the Army to sit around in barracks. Therefore
                    there is a balance to be struck and it's a different balance
                    for the young soldier or the young officer, who has the
                    spirit of adventure and wants to get out and do things,
                    than it is for his counterpart, a sergeant major or major,
                    in his mid-30s, who has almost certainly got a family and
                    has other things to be concerned about. These two sets of
                    individuals are never going to see either overstretch or
                    understretch in the same way.

                    For myself I think, over a period of time a figure of
                    around 20 per cent deployed, which equates to a
                    two-year tour, is about right taken over the long term.
                    But we are here at the end of the day as servants of the
                    Government and if they require us to do more than that -
                    and that's certainly where we are today - then that's what
                    we should do.

                    Q: You're saying the Army is stretched to the limit?

                    MJ: It's at the top end. It is not sustainable over any long
                    period.

                    Q: Is the Army happy with its kit?

                    MJ: In an ideal world the Army would be paid several
                    times more than it is, it would have the very best
                    equipment money could buy, but that is not the kind of
                    world we live in. The defence budget is not limitless. It is
                    for the Government to decide its priorities over public
                    spending, en passant, it is worth reminding ourselves that
                    there was a significant increase in the defence budget in
                    the last public spending round.

                    Q: I was reading about your fracas with General
                    Wesley Clark. [During the Kosovo crisis in 1999,
                    when General Jackson was the Commander of the
                    Kosovo Force, he was ordered by the Supreme
                    Commander of Nato Forces in Europe , US General
                    Wesley Clark, to capture Pristina airport to stop
                    the Russian reinforcements from landing. In a
                    heated argument, Gen Jackson told Gen Clark: "I'm
                    not starting World War III for you.]

                    MJ: You mean a difference of opinion [smiles wolfishly].

                    Q: Do you envisage the possibility of something
                    like that happening again because the American
                    army is out there in great numbers and we are
                    going out in great numbers and frictions can
                    develop.

                    MJ: The circumstances surrounding KFOR's entry into
                    Kosovo and, in particular, the circumstances which
                    surrounded Pristina airport, which lasted for about 48
                    hours, were very peculiar to the extraordinarily complex
                    political situation at that point.

                    But I'm not trying to duck the issue. When the stakes are
                    high and you have commanders quite rightly determined
                    to succeed in the mission they have been given, opinions
                    can vary and there can be friction. This is human nature
                    in a way, and military history is full of incidents whereby,
                    under pressure of events, there have been disagreements
                    but which then are overcome.

                    Q: How damaging is it to the morale of soldiers if
                    they have to fight a war in the Gulf without the
                    overwhelming support of the people back home?

                    MJ: The British soldier is a fairly robust being and I don't
                    think we need to feel concerned, at the moment, that he
                    feels unloved.

                    As far as I am concerned, within the Army, there is
                    absolutely no sense that we are on our own, there is no
                    sense that soldiers don't want to go to the Gulf. On the
                    contrary, soldiers not going get cross with those who are,
                    that is the way of the British Army and it is a very healthy
                    way.

                    Q: Troops who served in the Vietnam conflict felt
                    the contempt of the American public for their
                    actions. Are you concerned that the British public
                    may develop a similar attitude?

                    MJ: Well, I and no doubt everybody else is perfectly
                    aware of the lesson which came out of the Vietnam war.
                    It was a very long and drawn-out war, it was a war for
                    which the United States, as a body politic, veered and
                    hauled quite a lot. I don't see that sort of situation at all
                    here. Yes, there is a huge international debate going on,
                    and a domestic one as well, but we are not at the point of
                    decision yet and nor do I see it [a war on Iraq] as a long
                    drawn-out conflict in that way, nor do I see it as a conflict
                    which is going to incur the horrific casualties of Vietnam.

                    Q: Kosovo was a conflict undertaken without UN
                    backing and was successful, so presumably you
                    don't have any concerns about having another
                    campaign which doesn't have the backing of the
                    UN?

                    MJ: I wouldn't like to speculate on what the precise
                    political and legal conditions are going to be if and when
                    the decision [to go to war] is taken. That said, I satisfied
                    myself over Kosovo that my own Government was clear
                    that what was being done was within the ambit of
                    international law.

                    Q: Do you agree that if it comes to war, many Iraqi
                    troops may not want to fight?

                    MJ: Yes. I think that's fair comment. The degree to which
                    the Iraqi armed forces will feel, if it comes to it, that they
                    wish to risk all for Saddam Hussein is a very potent
                    question.

                    Q: What is the military objective of an invasion of
                    Iraq?

                    MJ: Military forces are used to achieve political ends. One
                    needs, in any campaign, to be clear what those political
                    ends are. You can then calculate what the military
                    objectives required are to meet those political ends and
                    then you work out how to get from A to B. But the ends
                    are political - they must be.

                    Q: Is the British Army fully prepared to face an
                    enemy who may use chemical and biological
                    weapons?

                    MJ: Fear in all aspects of life is about ignorance. Part of
                    removing that fear is good training and good equipment.
                    As far as Britain is concerned, we are one of the leading
                    nations when it comes to defensive measures with
                    equipment, techniques and clothing where this black world
                    of biological and chemical weapons is concerned.

                    I have no doubt that soldiers, deployed and deploying to
                    the Middle East will be thinking about this very hard, and
                    will be making sure their own personal training and
                    equipment is up to scratch.

                    Q: How concerned are you over the issue of
                    friendly fire? [In the last Gulf war, nine British
                    soldiers were killed when a US jet mistook their
                    armoured personnel carrier for an enemy tank.]

                    MJ: It is a matter of historical fact that when armies take
                    the field we get the so-called blue-on-blue. Why is this?
                    Because human beings are not perfect. Human beings
                    make mistakes. How do you avoid it or minimise it? There
                    are a number of approaches. As important as clever
                    electronic kit is, so is having your procedures right,
                    having your tactics and training right. Yes, you can add to
                    that with clever black boxes which send out signals saying
                    who you are, and much is in hand to make sure that, if
                    and when operations commence, we are are fully
                    equipped for this in every sense. When I say fully
                    equipped, I mean equipped by training and understanding
                    as much as by equipment. However, you can not
                    eradicate this risk.

                    Q: The Americans sometimes give the impression
                    that they could fight a Gulf war on their own and
                    view Britain's involvement as a political rather
                    than a military necessity.

                    MJ: If that is so, I would think it was somewhat of an
                    ungenerous view but they are perfectly entitled to have it.
                    The United States' military capability is far ahead of
                    everybody else's. But if you ask the American
                    government or the Pentagon if they want a British
                    contribution on the ground, at sea and in the air, I know
                    what the answer is going to be. They will say: "yes". It's
                    not just a matter of politics. It is a sense of
                    burden-sharing, which is quite important, not having to do
                    this on one's own. In general terms, of course. there is a
                    political dimension, and it may well be the dominant
                    dimension. I wouldn't necessarily argue with that, but I
                    don't think it's quite as simple as that.

                    Q: Are you concerned about our troops fighting in
                    Iraqi cities such as Baghdad?

                    MJ: It comes as no great secret that fighting in built-up
                    areas is messy, casualty-heavy and, frankly, best
                    avoided. So I am sure if it comes to it much lateral
                    thinking will be employed.

                    "I'm up for it", that's the way the soldiers talk. But a
                    traditional-style battle in cities has, historically, shown to
                    have high casualties and I don't wish that on my Army or
                    indeed anyone else's. And I'm sure British soldiers who
                    think beyond "I'm up for it", will think there must be
                    another way of doing this.

                    Q: Will British troops be involved in a post-Saddam
                    Iraq and for how long?

                    MJ: If this conflict is fought, logic says there will be a
                    post-conflict situation, and in my view the post-conflict
                    situation will be more demanding and challenging than the
                    conflict itself, which could be relatively swift and with low
                    casualties. Then there is the question of rebuilding, and I
                    don't mean that in the physical sense, I mean rebuilding
                    the body politic of Iraq. The outcome desired is very
                    clear: an Iraq in its present borders, at ease with itself,
                    with its neighbours, with a representative government.
                    And that will take assistance in the same way as
                    Afghanistan did.

                    I have no doubt that if this set of circumstances comes
                    about the United Kingdom will be asked to play a part in
                    that process. Its not just a military process. Frankly, it's
                    far from being just a military process. It is many-faceted:
                    economic reconstruction, political development,
                    humanitarian aid, the return of four million presently
                    expatriate Iraqis, and I imagine the bulk of them would
                    wish to go home. Dare I say it, the British Army is very
                    experienced in this.

                    Q: How long do you estimate that will last?

                    MJ: I can hazard a guess. There will be a wish, rightly in
                    my view, by the coalition to minimise that period of time.
                    The Afghanistan process is perhaps something of a model
                    but one needs to be careful. I would think it would be
                    prudent to work on a year or two. It may be less.

                    Q: It's not just demonstrators protesting in Hyde
                    Park, eminent retired generals say we shouldn't go
                    to war with Iraq. Do you think their views
                    undermine our soldiers' morale.

                    MJ: I don't think their comments are read by many
                    soldiers and I expect many young officers don't pay much
                    attention either. Colonels, I expect, may read them, say
                    "um" and turn the page. They're perfectly entitled to their
                    opinion but, of course, they are retired and therefore not
                    fully informed.

                    Q: Do you share the view that "war is hell"?

                    MJ: I don't think it can be described as anything else. It's
                    an emotive term but I know what it means. It is the most
                    unpleasant experience that a human being can imagine or
                    experience. War is a small word but encompasses so
                    much. Look at Berlin in 1945 - horrific. Stalingrad or Caen
                    - horrific battles of human misery writ large. But I'm not
                    sure that modern war is like that. It doesn't necessarily
                    involve bitter hand-to-hand fighting over this pile of
                    rubble and that for weeks on end, so there may be
                    degrees of hell. War is the last resort and soldiers know
                    that better than anyone else. If that is what is required,
                    that in the last analysis is what we are here to do.

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