Here is the full text of the statement by Hans Blix to the
                    UN Security Council:

                    Mr President, since I reported to the Security Council on
                    27 January Unmovic [the UN weapons inspection agency]
                    has had two further weeks of operational and analytical
                    work in New York and active inspections in Iraq.

                    This brings the total period of inspections to 11 weeks. Since
                    then we have also listened on the 5th of February to the
                    presentation to the council by the US Secretary of State
                    and the discussion that followed.

                    Lastly, Dr ElBaradei
                    and I have held another round of talks in Baghdad with
                    our counterparts and with Vice President Ramadan on the
                    8th of February.

                    Let me begin today's briefing with a short account of the
                    work performed by Unmovic in Iraq. We have continued
                    to build up our capabilities. The regional office in Mosul is
                    now fully operational at its temporary headquarters.

                    Plans for a regional office in Basra are being developed.

                    Our Hercules L 100 aircraft continues to operate routine
                    flights between Baghdad and Larnaca. The eight
                    helicopters are fully operational. With the resolution of the
                    problems raised by Iraq for the transportation of minders
                    into the low-fly zones our mobility in these zones has
                    improved.

                                     We expect increased utilisation of
                                     the helicopters. The number of
                                     Iraqi minders during inspections
                                     had also reached a ratio as high as
                                     five per inspector. During the talks
                                     in January in Baghdad the Iraqi
                                     side agreed to keep the ratio to
                                     about one-to-one. The situation
                                     has improved.

                                     Since we have arrived in Iraq we
                    have conducted more than 400 inspections covering more
                    than 300 sites. All inspections were performed without
                    notice and access was almost always provided promptly.
                    In no case have we seen convincing evidence that the
                    Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors were
                    coming.

                    The inspections have taken place throughout Iraq at
                    industrial sites, ammunition depots, research centres,
                    universities, presidential sites, mobile laboratories,
                    privates houses, missile productions facilities, military
                    camps and agricultural sites.

                    At all sites which had been inspected before 1998, rebase
                    lining activities were performed.

                    This included the identification of the function and
                    contents of each building, new or old, at a site.

                    It also included verification of previously-tagged
                    equipment, application of seals and tags, taking samples
                    and discussions with the site's personnel regarding past
                    and present activities.

                    At certain sites ground-penetrating radar was used to look
                    for underground structures or buried equipment.

                    Through the inspections conducted
                    so far we have obtained a good
                    knowledge of the industrial and
                    scientific landscape of Iraq, as well
                    as of its missile capability. But as
                    before, we do not know every
                    cave and corner.

                    Inspections are effectively helping to bridge the gaps in
                    knowledge that arose due to the absence of inspections
                    between December 1998 and November 2002. More than
                    200 chemical and more than 100 biological samples have
                    been collected at different sites. Three-quarters of these
                    have been screened using our own analytical laboratory
                    capabilities at the Baghdad centre.

                    The results to date have been consistent with Iraqi
                    declarations. We have now commenced the process of
                    destroying approximately 50 litres of mustard gas
                    declared by Iraq that was being kept under Unmovic's
                    seal at the Muthanna site.

                    One third of the quantity has already been destroyed. The
                    laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas
                    precursor which we found at another site, has also been
                    destroyed.

                                     The total number of staff in Iraq
                                     now exceeds 250, from 60
                                     countries. This includes about 100
                                     Unmovic inspectors, 15 IAEA
                                     [International Atomic Energy
                                     Agency] inspectors 50 air crew
                                     and 65 support staff.

                                     Mr President, in my 27 January
                                     update to the Council I said that it
                                     seemed from our experience that
                                     Iraq had decided in principle to
                                     provide co-operation on process
                                     most importantly and prompt
                                     access to all sites and assistance
                                     to Unmovic in the establishment of
                    the necessary infrastructure. This impression remains and
                    we note that access to sites has so far been without
                    problems, including those that have never been declared
                    or inspected, as well as the Presidential sites and private
                    residences.

                    In my last updating, I also said that a decision to
                    co-operate on substance was indispensable in order to
                    bring, through inspection, the disarmament task to
                    completion and to set the monitoring system on a firm
                    course. Such co-operation, as I have noted, requires
                    more than the opening of doors. 

                    In the words of resolution 1441 (2002) - it requires
                    immediate, unconditional and active efforts by Iraq to
                    resolve existing questions of disarmament - either by
                    presenting remaining proscribed items and programmes
                    for elimination or by presenting convincing evidence that
                    they have been eliminated.

                    In the current situation, one would expect Iraq to be
                    eager to comply. While we were in Baghdad, we met a
                    delegation from the government of South Africa. It was
                    there to explain how South Africa gained the confidence
                    of the world in its dismantling of the nuclear weapons
                    programme, by a wholehearted co-operation over two
                    years with IAEA inspectors. I have just learned that Iraq
                    has accepted an offer by South Africa to send a group of
                    experts for further talks. 

                    How much, if any, is left of Iraq's
                    weapons of mass destruction and
                    related proscribed items and
                    programmes? So far, Unmovic has
                    not found any such weapons, only
                    a small number of empty chemical
                    munitions, which should have been
                    declared and destroyed. Another
                    matter - and one of great
                    significance - is that many
                    proscribed weapons and items are
                    not accounted for. 

                    To take an example, a document,
                    which Iraq provided, suggested to
                    us that some 1,000 tonnes of
                    chemical agent were "unaccounted
                    for". One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist.
                    However, that possibility is also not excluded. If they
                    exist, they should be presented for destruction. If they do
                    not exist, credible evidence to that effect should be
                    presented.

                    We are fully aware that many governmental intelligence
                    organisations are convinced and assert that proscribed
                    weapons, items and programmes continue to exist. The
                    US Secretary of State presented material in support of
                    this conclusion. Governments have many sources of
                    information that are not available to inspectors.
                    Inspectors, for their part, must base their reports only on
                    evidence, which they can, themselves, examine and
                    present publicly. Without evidence, confidence cannot
                    arise.

                    Mr President, in my earlier briefings, I have noted that
                    significant outstanding issues of substance were listed in
                    two Security Council documents from early 1999
                    (S/1999/94 and S/1999/356) and should be well known to
                    Iraq. I referred, as examples, to the issues of anthrax,
                    the nerve agent VX and long-range missiles, and said that
                    such issues "deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather
                    than being brushed aside ". 

                    The declaration submitted by Iraq on 7 December last
                    year, despite its large volume, missed the opportunity to
                    provide the fresh material and evidence needed to
                    respond to the open questions. This is perhaps the most
                    important problem we are facing. Although I can
                    understand that it may not be easy for Iraq in all cases to
                    provide the evidence needed, it is not the task of the
                    inspectors to find it. Iraq itself must squarely tackle this
                    task and avoid belittling the questions.

                    In my January update to the Council, I referred to the Al
                    Samoud 2 and the Al Fatah missiles, reconstituted casting
                    chambers, construction of a missile engine test stand and
                    the import of rocket engines, which were all declared to
                    Unmovic by Iraq. 

                    I noted that the Al Samoud 2 and the Al Fatah could very
                    well represent prima facie cases of proscribed missile
                    systems, as they had been tested to ranges exceeding
                    the 150-kilometre limit set by the Security Council. I also
                    noted that Iraq had been requested to cease flight tests of
                    these missiles until Unmovic completed a technical
                    review.

                    Earlier this week, Unmovic missile experts met for two
                    days with experts from a number of Member States to
                    discuss these items. The experts concluded unanimously
                    that, based on the data provided by Iraq, the two
                    declared variants of the Al Samoud 2 missile were
                    capable of exceeding 150 kilometres in range. This
                    missile system is therefore proscribed for Iraq pursuant
                    to resolution 687 (1991) and the monitoring plan adopted
                    by resolution 715 (1991).

                    As for the Al Fatah, the experts found that clarification of
                    the missile data supplied by Iraq was required before the
                    capability of the missile system could be fully assessed.

                    With respect to the casting chambers, I note the
                    following: Unscom ordered and supervised the destruction
                    of the casting chambers, which had been intended for use
                    in the production of the proscribed Badr-2000 missile
                    system. Iraq has declared that it has reconstituted these
                    chambers. 

                    The experts have confirmed that the reconstituted casting
                    chambers could still be used to produce motors for
                    missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150
                    kilometres. Accordingly, these chambers remain
                    proscribed.

                    The experts also studied the data on the missile engine
                    test stand that is nearing completion and have assessed it
                    to be capable of testing missile engines with thrusts
                    greater than that of the SA-2 engine. So far, the test
                    stand has not been associated with a proscribed activity.

                    On the matter of the 380 SA-2 missile engines imported
                    outside of the export/import mechanism and in
                    contravention of paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991),
                    Unmovic inspectors were informed by Iraq during an
                    official briefing that these engines were intended for use
                    in the Al Samoud 2 missile system, which has now been
                    assessed to be proscribed. Any such engines configured
                    for use in this missile system would also be proscribed.

                    I intend to communicate these findings to the Government
                    of Iraq.

                    At the meeting in Baghdad on 8 and 9 February, the Iraqi
                    side addressed some of the important outstanding
                    disarmament issues and gave us a number of papers,
                    e.g. regarding anthrax and growth material, the nerve
                    agent VX and missile production. Experts who were
                    present from our side studied the papers during the
                    evening of 8 February and met with Iraqi experts in the
                    morning of 9 February for further clarifications. 

                    Although no new evidence was provided in the papers and
                    no open issues were closed through them or the expert
                    discussions, the presentation of the papers could be
                    indicative of a more active attitude focusing on important
                    open issues.

                    The Iraqi side suggested that the problem of verifying the
                    quantities of anthrax and two VX-precursors, which had
                    been declared unilaterally destroyed, might be tackled
                    through certain technical and analytical methods.
                    Although our experts are still assessing the suggestions,
                    they are not very hopeful that it could prove possible to
                    assess the quantities of material poured into the ground
                    years ago. Documentary evidence and testimony by staff
                    that dealt with the items still appears to be needed.

                    Not least against this background, a letter of 12 February
                    from Iraq's National Monitoring Directorate may be of
                    relevance. It presents a list of 83 names of participants
                    "in the unilateral destruction in the chemical field, which
                    took place in the summer of 1991". As the absence of
                    adequate evidence of that destruction has been and
                    remains an important reason why quantities of chemicals
                    have been deemed "unaccounted for", the presentation of
                    a list of persons who can be interviewed about the actions
                    appears useful and pertains to co-operation on substance.

                                     I trust that the Iraqi side will put
                                     together a similar list of names of
                                     persons who participated in the
                                     unilateral destruction of other
                                     proscribed items, notably in the
                                     biological field.

                                     The Iraqi side also informed us
                                     that the commission, which had
                                     been appointed in the wake of our
                    finding 12 empty chemical weapons warheads, had had its
                    mandate expanded to look for any still existing proscribed
                    items. This was welcomed.

                    A second commission, we learnt, has now been appointed
                    with the task of searching all over Iraq for more
                    documents relevant to the elimination of proscribed items
                    and programmes. It is headed by the former Minister of
                    Oil, General Amer Rashid, and is to have very extensive
                    powers of search in industry, administration and even
                    private houses.

                    The two commissions could be useful tools to come up
                    with proscribed items to be destroyed and with new
                    documentary evidence. They evidently need to work fast
                    and effectively to convince us, and the world, that it is a
                    serious effort.

                    The matter of private interviews was discussed at length
                    during our meeting in Baghdad. The Iraqi side confirmed
                    the commitment, which it made to us on 20 January, to
                    encourage persons asked to accept such interviews,
                    whether in or out of Iraq. So far, we have only had
                    interviews in Baghdad. 

                    A number of persons have declined to be interviewed,
                    unless they were allowed to have an official present or
                    were allowed to tape the interview. Three persons that
                    had previously refused interviews on Unmovic's terms,
                    subsequently accepted such interviews just prior to our
                    talks in Baghdad on 8 and 9 February. These interviews
                    proved informative. 

                    No further interviews have since been accepted on our
                    terms. I hope this will change. We feel that interviews
                    conducted without any third party present and without
                    tape recording would provide the greatest credibility.

                    At the recent meeting in Baghdad, as on several earlier
                    occasions, my colleague Dr ElBaradei and I have urged
                    the Iraqi side to enact legislation implementing the UN
                    prohibitions regarding weapons of mass destruction. 

                    This morning we had a message that a Presidential
                    decree has now been issued containing prohibitions with
                    regard to importation and production of biological,
                    chemical and nuclear weapons. We have not yet had time
                    to study the details of the text of the decree. 

                    Mr President, I should like to make some comments on
                    the role of intelligence in connection with inspections in
                    Iraq.

                    A credible inspection regime requires that Iraq provide
                    full co-operation on "process" - granting immediate
                    access everywhere to inspectors - and on substance,
                    providing full declarations supported by relevant
                    information and material and evidence.

                    However, with the closed society in Iraq of today and the
                    history of inspections there, other sources of information,
                    such as defectors and government intelligence agencies
                    are required to aid the inspection process.

                    I remember myself how, in 1991, several inspections in
                    Iraq, which were based on information received from a
                    Government, helped to disclose important parts of the
                    nuclear weapons programme.

                    It was realised that an
                    international organisation
                    authorised to perform inspections
                    anywhere on the ground could
                    make good use of information
                    obtained from governments with
                    eyes in the sky, ears in the ether,
                    access to defectors, and both eyes
                    and ears on the market for
                    weapons-related material.

                    It was understood that the
                    information residing in the intelligence services of
                    governments could come to very active use in the
                    international effort to prevent proliferation of weapons of
                    mass destruction. This remains true and we have by now
                    a good deal of experience in the matter.

                    International organisations need to analyse such
                    information critically and especially benefit when it comes
                    from more than one source. The intelligence agencies, for
                    their part, must protect their sources and methods.

                    Those who provide such information must know that it will
                    be kept in strict confidence and be known to very few
                    people. Unmovic has achieved good working relations
                    with intelligence agencies and the amount of information
                    provided has been gradually increasing.

                    However, we must recognise that there are limitations
                    and that misinterpretations can occur.

                    Intelligence information has been useful for Unmovic. In
                    one case, it led us to a private home where documents
                    mainly relating to laser enrichment of uranium were
                    found. In other cases, intelligence has led to sites where
                    no proscribed items were found.

                    Even in such cases, however, inspection of these sites
                    were useful in proving the absence of such items and in
                    some cases the presence of other items - conventional
                    munitions.

                                     It showed that conventional arms
                                     are being moved around the
                                     country and that movements are
                                     not necessarily related to weapons
                                     of mass destruction.

                                     The presentation of intelligence
                                     information by the US Secretary of
                                     State suggested that Iraq had
                                     prepared for inspections by
                                     cleaning up sites and removing
                                     evidence of proscribed weapons
                                     programmes.

                                     I would like to comment only on
                                     one case, which we are familiar
                    with, namely, the trucks identified by analysts as being
                    for chemical decontamination at a munitions depot. This
                    was a declared site, and it was certainly one of the sites
                    Iraq would have expected us to inspect.

                    We have noted that the two satellite images of the site
                    were taken several weeks apart.

                    The reported movement of munitions at the site could just
                    as easily have been a routine activity as a movement of
                    proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent
                    inspection.

                    Our reservation on this point does not detract from our
                    appreciation of the briefing.

                    Yesterday, Unmovic informed the Iraqi authorities of its
                    intention to start using the U-2 surveillance aircraft early
                    next week under arrangements similar to those Unscom
                    had followed.

                    We are also in the process of working out modalities for
                    the use of the French Mirage aircraft starting late next
                    week and for the drones supplied by the German
                    Government. 

                    The offer from Russia of an Antonov aircraft, with night
                    vision capabilities, is a welcome one and is next on our
                    agenda for further improving Unmovic's and IAEA's
                    technical capabilities.

                    These developments are in line with suggestions made in
                    a non-paper recently circulated by France, suggesting a
                    further strengthening of the inspection capabilities.

                    It is our intention to examine the possibilities for
                    surveying ground movements, notably by trucks.

                    In the face of persistent intelligence reports for instance
                    about mobile biological weapons production units, such
                    measures could well increase the effectiveness of
                    inspections.

                    Unmovic is still expanding its capabilities, both in terms of
                    numbers of staff and technical resources.

                    On my way to the recent Baghdad meeting, I stopped in
                    Vienna to meet 60 experts, who had just completed our
                    general training course for inspectors.

                    They came from 22 countries, including Arab countries.

                    Mr President, Unmovic is not infrequently asked how
                    much more time it needs to complete its task in Iraq.

                    The answer depends upon which task one has in mind -
                    the elimination of weapons of mass destruction and
                    related items and programmes, which were prohibited in
                    1991 - the disarmament task - or the monitoring that no
                    new proscribed activities occur.

                    The latter task, though not often focused upon, is highly
                    significant - and not controversial.

                    It will require monitoring, which is "ongoing", that is,
                    open-ended until the Council decides otherwise.

                    By contrast, the task of "disarmament" foreseen in
                    resolution 687 (1991) and the progress on "key remaining
                    disarmament tasks" foreseen in resolution 1284 (1999) as
                    well as the "disarmament obligations", which Iraq was
                    given a "final opportunity to comply with" under resolution
                    1441 (2002), were always required to be fulfilled in a
                    shorter time span.

                    Regrettably, the high degree of co-operation required of
                    Iraq for disarmament through inspection was not
                    forthcoming in 1991.

                    Despite the elimination, under Unscom and IAEA
                    supervision, of large amounts of weapons,
                    weapons-related items and installations over the years,
                    the task remained incomplete, when inspectors were
                    withdrawn almost eight years later at the end of 1998.

                    If Iraq had provided the necessary co-operation in 1991,
                    the phase of disarmament - under resolution 687 (1991) -
                    could have been short and a decade of sanctions could
                    have been avoided.

                    Today, three months after the adoption of resolution 1441
                    (2002), the period of disarmament through inspection
                    could still be short, if "immediate, active and unconditional
                    co-operation" with Unmovic and the IAEA were to be
                    forthcoming.

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