The resolution adopted by the Security Council on Iraq in
                    November last year asks Unmovic and the IAEA to
                    “update” the Council 60 days after the resumption of
                    inspections. This is today.

                    The updating, it seems, forms part of an assessment by
                    the Council and its Members of the results, so far, of the
                    inspections and of their role as a means to achieve
                    verifiable disarmament in Iraq. 

                    As this is an open meeting of the Council, it may be
                    appropriate briefly to provide some background for a
                    better understanding of where we stand today. With your
                    permission, I shall do so. I begin by recalling that
                    inspections as a part of a disarmament
                    process in Iraq started in 1991, immediately after the Gulf
                    War. They went on for eight years until December 1998,
                    when inspectors were withdrawn. 

                    Thereafter, for nearly four years there were no
                    inspections. They were resumed only at the end of
                    November last year. While the fundamental aim of
                    inspections in Iraq has always been to verify
                    disarmament, the successive resolutions adopted by the
                    Council over the years have varied somewhat in
                    emphasis and approach. In 1991, resolution 687 (1991),
                    adopted unanimously as a part of the ceasefire after the
                    Gulf War, had five major elements. 

                    The three first related to disarmament. They called for
                    declarations by Iraq of its programmes of weapons of
                    mass destruction and long range missiles; verification of
                    the declarations through Unscom and the IAEA;
                    supervision by these organizations of the destruction or
                    the elimination of proscribed programmes and items. 

                    After the completion of the disarmament: · the Council
                    would have authority to proceed to a lifting of the
                    sanctions (economic restrictions); and the inspecting
                    organizations would move to long-term ongoing
                    monitoring and verification. Resolution 687, like the
                    subsequent resolutions I shall refer to, required
                    co-operation by Iraq but such was often withheld or given
                    grudgingly. 

                    Unlike South Africa, which decided on its own to eliminate
                    its nuclear weapons and welcomed inspection as a means
                    of creating confidence in its disarmament, Iraq appears
                    not to have come to a genuine acceptance – not even
                    today – of the disarmament, which was demanded of it
                    and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of
                    the world and to live in peace. As we know, the twin
                    operation ‘declare and verify’, which was prescribed in
                    resolution 687, too often turned into a game of ‘hide and
                    seek’. 

                    Rather than just verifying declarations and supporting
                    evidence, the two inspecting organizations found
                    themselves engaged in efforts to map the weapons
                    programmes and to search for evidence through
                    inspections, interviews, seminars, inquiries with suppliers
                    and intelligence organizations. As a result, the
                    disarmament phase was not completed in the short time
                    expected. Sanctions remained and took a severe toll until
                    Iraq accepted the Oil for Food Programme and the
                    gradual development of that programme mitigated the
                    effects of the sanctions. 

                    The implementation of resolution
                    687 nevertheless brought about
                    considerable disarmament results.
                    It has been recognized that more
                    weapons of mass destruction were
                    destroyed under this resolution
                    than were destroyed during the
                    Gulf War: large quantities of
                    chemical weapons were destroyed
                    under Unscom supervision before
                    1994. 

                    While Iraq claims – with little
                    evidence – that it destroyed all
                    biological weapons unilaterally in
                    1991, it is certain that Unscom
                    destroyed large biological weapons
                    production facilities in 1996. 

                    The large nuclear infrastructure
                    was destroyed and the fissionable material was removed
                    from Iraq by the IAEA. One of three important questions
                    before us today is how much might remain undeclared
                    and intact from before 1991; and, possibly, thereafter;
                    the second question is what, if anything, was illegally
                    produced or procured after 1998, when the inspectors
                    left; and the third question is how it can be prevented that
                    any weapons of mass destruction be produced or
                    procured in the future. 

                    In December 1999 – after one year without inspections in
                    Iraq – resolution 1284 was adopted by the Council with
                    four abstentions. Supplementing the basic resolutions of
                    1991 and following years, it provided Iraq with a
                    somewhat less ambitious approach: in return for
                    “co-operation in all respects” for a specified period of
                    time, including progress in the resolution of “key
                    remaining disarmament tasks”, it opened the possibility,
                    not for the lifting, but the suspension of sanctions. For
                    nearly three years, Iraq refused to accept any inspections
                    by Unmovic. 

                    It was only after appeals by the Secretary-General and
                    Arab States and pressure by the United States and other
                    Member States, that Iraq declared on 16 September last
                    year that it would again accept inspections without
                    conditions. Resolution 1441 (2002) was adopted on Nov 8
                    last year and emphatically reaffirmed the demand on Iraq
                    to co-operate. 

                    It required this co-operation to be immediate,
                    unconditional and active. The resolution contained many
                    provisions, which we welcome as enhancing and
                    strengthening the inspection regime. The unanimity by
                    which it was adopted sent a powerful signal that the
                    Council was of one mind in creating a last opportunity for
                    peaceful disarmament in Iraq through inspection. 

                    Unmovic shares the sense of urgency felt by the Council
                    to use inspection as a path to attain, within a reasonable
                    time, verifiable disarmament of Iraq. Under the
                    resolutions I have cited, it would be followed by
                    monitoring for such time as the Council feels would be
                    required. The resolutions also point to a zone free of
                    weapons of mass destruction as the ultimate goal. 

                    As a subsidiary body of the Council, Unmovic is fully
                    aware of and appreciates the close attention, which the
                    Council devotes to the inspections in Iraq. While today’s
                    “updating” is foreseen in resolution 1441, the Council can
                    and does call for additional briefings whenever it wishes.
                    One was held on Jan 19 and a further such briefing is
                    tentatively set for Feb 14. I turn now to the key
                    requirement of co-operation and Iraq’s response to it. 

                    Co-operation might be said to relate to both substance
                    and process. It would appear from our experience so far
                    that Iraq has decided in principle to provide co-operation
                    on process, notably access. A similar decision is
                    indispensable to provide co-operation on substance in
                    order to bring the disarmament task to completion
                    through the peaceful process of inspection and to bring
                    the monitoring task on a firm course. An initial minor step
                    would be to adopt the long-overdue legislation required
                    by the resolutions. I shall deal first with co-operation on
                    process. 

                    Co-operation on process 

                    It has regard to the procedures, mechanisms,
                    infrastructure and practical arrangements to pursue
                    inspections and seek verifiable disarmament. While
                    inspection is not built on the premise of confidence but
                    may lead to confidence if it is successful, there must
                    nevertheless be a measure of mutual confidence from the
                    very beginning in running the operation of inspection. Iraq
                    has on the whole co-operated rather well so far with
                    Unmovic in this field. 

                    The most important point to make is that access has been
                    provided to all sites we have wanted to inspect and with
                    one exception it has been prompt. We have further had
                    great help in building up the infrastructure of our office in
                    Baghdad and the field office in Mosul. Arrangements and
                    services for our plane and our helicopters have been
                    good. 

                    The environment has been workable. Our inspections
                    have included universities, military bases, presidential
                    sites and private residences. Inspections have also taken
                    place on Fridays, the Muslim day of rest, on Christmas
                    day and New Years day. These inspections have been
                    conducted in the same manner as all other inspections.
                    We seek to be both effective and correct. In this updating
                    I am bound, however, to register some problems.

                    Firstly, relating to two kinds of air operations. While we
                    now have the technical capability to send a U-2 plane
                    placed at our disposal for aerial imagery and for
                    surveillance during inspections and have informed Iraq
                    that we planned to do so, Iraq has refused to guarantee
                    its safety, unless a number of conditions are fulfilled. As
                    these conditions went beyond what is stipulated in
                    resolution 1441 and what was practiced by Unscom and
                    Iraq in the past, we note that Iraq is not so far complying
                    with our request. I hope this attitude will change. 

                    Another air operation problem – which was solved during
                    our recent talks in Baghdad – concerned the use of
                    helicopters flying into the no-fly zones. Iraq had insisted
                    on sending helicopters of their own to accompany ours.
                    This would have raised a safety problem. The matter was
                    solved by an offer on our part to take the accompanying
                    Iraq minders in our helicopters to the sites, an
                    arrangement that had been practiced by Unscom in the
                    past. I am obliged to note some recent disturbing
                    incidents and harassment. 

                    For instance, for some time farfetched allegations have
                    been made publicly that questions posed by inspectors
                    were of intelligence character. While I might not defend
                    every question that inspectors might have asked, Iraq
                    knows that they do not serve intelligence purposes and
                    Iraq should not say so. On a number of occasions,
                    demonstrations have taken place in front of our offices
                    and at inspection sites. The other day, a sightseeing
                    excursion by five inspectors to a mosque was followed by
                    an unwarranted public outburst. The inspectors went
                    without any UN insignia and were welcomed in the kind
                    manner that is characteristic of the normal Iraqi attitude
                    to foreigners. They took off their shoes and were taken
                    around. 

                    They asked perfectly innocent questions and parted with
                    the invitation to come again. Shortly thereafter, we
                    receive protests from the Iraqi authorities about an
                    unannounced inspection and about questions not relevant
                    to weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, they were not.
                    Demonstrations and outbursts of this kind are unlikely to
                    occur in Iraq without initiative or encouragement from the
                    authorities. We must ask ourselves what the motives may
                    be for these events. They do not facilitate an already
                    difficult job, in which we try to be effective, professional
                    and, at the same time, correct. 

                    Where our Iraqi counterparts have some complaint they
                    can take it up in a calmer and less unpleasant manner. 

                    Co-operation on substance 

                    The substantive co-operation required relates above all to
                    the obligation of Iraq to declare all programmes of
                    weapons of mass destruction and either to present items
                    and activities for elimination or else to provide evidence
                    supporting the conclusion that nothing proscribed
                    remains. Paragraph nine of resolution 1441 states that
                    this co-operation shall be “active”. It is not enough to
                    open doors. Inspection is not a game of “catch as catch
                    can”. 

                    Rather, as I noted, it is a process of verification for the
                    purpose of creating confidence. It is not built upon the
                    premise of trust. Rather, it is designed to lead to trust, if
                    there is both openness to the inspectors and action to
                    present them with items to destroy or credible evidence
                    about the absence of any such items. 

                    The declaration of Dec 7 

                    On Dec 7 2002, Iraq submitted a declaration of some
                    12,000 pages in response to paragraph three of resolution
                    1441 and within the time stipulated by the Security
                    Council. In the fields of missiles and biotechnology, the
                    declaration contains a good deal of new material and
                    information covering the period from 1998 and onward.
                    This is welcome. 

                                     One might have expected that in
                                     preparing the Declaration, Iraq
                                     would have tried to respond to,
                                     clarify and submit supporting
                                     evidence regarding the many open
                                     disarmament issues, which the
                                     Iraqi side should be familiar with
                                     from the Unscom document
                                     S/1999/94 of January1999 and the
                                     so-called Amorim Report of March
                                     1999 (S/1999/356). 

                                     These are questions which
                                     Unmovic, governments and
                                     independent commentators have
                                     often cited. While Unmovic has
                                     been preparing its own list of
                                     current “unresolved disarmament
                                     issues” and “key remaining
                    disarmament tasks” in response to requirements in
                    resolution 1284 (1999), we find the issues listed in the two
                    reports as unresolved, professionally justified. 

                    These reports do not contend that weapons of mass
                    destruction remain in Iraq, but nor do they exclude that
                    possibility. They point to lack of evidence and
                    inconsistencies, which raise question marks, which must
                    be straightened out, if weapons dossiers are to be closed
                    and confidence is to arise. They deserve to be taken
                    seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed aside as evil
                    machinations of Unscom. Regrettably, the 12,000 page
                    declaration, most of which is a reprint of earlier
                    documents, does not seem to contain any new evidence
                    that would eliminate the questions or reduce their
                    number. 

                    Even Iraq’s letter sent in response to our recent
                    discussions in Baghdad to the President of the Security
                    Council on Jan 24 does not lead us to the resolution of
                    these issues. I shall only give some examples of issues
                    and questions that need to be answered and I turn first to
                    the sector of chemical weapons. 

                    Chemical weapons

                    The nerve agent VX is one of the most toxic ever
                    developed. Iraq has declared that it only produced VX on
                    a pilot scale, just a few tonnes and that the quality was
                    poor and the product unstable. Consequently, it was said,
                    that the agent was never weaponised. 

                    Iraq said that the small quantity of agent remaining after
                    the Gulf War was unilaterally destroyed in the summer of
                    1991. Unmovic, however, has information that conflicts
                    with this account. There are indications that Iraq had
                    worked on the problem of purity and stabilization and that
                    more had been achieved than has been declared. Indeed,
                    even one of the documents provided by Iraq indicates
                    that the purity of the agent, at least in laboratory
                    production, was higher than declared. 

                    There are also indications that the agent was weaponised.
                    In addition, there are questions to be answered
                    concerning the fate of the VX precursor chemicals, which
                    Iraq states were lost during bombing in the Gulf War or
                    were unilaterally destroyed by Iraq. I would now like to
                    turn to the so-called “Air Force document” that I have
                    discussed with the Council before. This document was
                    originally found by an Unscom inspector in a safe in Iraqi
                    Air Force Headquarters in 1998 and taken from her by
                    Iraqi minders. It gives an account of the expenditure of
                    bombs, including chemical bombs, by Iraq in the
                    Iraq-Iran War. 

                    I am encouraged by the fact that Iraq has now provided
                    this document to Unmovic. The document indicates that
                    13,000 chemical bombs were dropped by the Iraqi Air
                    Force between 1983 and 1988, while Iraq has declared
                    that 19,500 bombs were consumed during this period.
                    Thus, there is a discrepancy of 6,500 bombs. 

                    The amount of chemical agent in these bombs would be in
                    the order of about 1,000 tonnes. In the absence of
                    evidence to the contrary, we must assume that these
                    quantities are now unaccounted for. The discovery of a
                    number of 122 mm chemical rocket warheads in a bunker
                    at a storage depot 170 km southwest of Baghdad was
                    much publicized. 

                    This was a relatively new bunker and therefore the
                    rockets must have been moved there in the past few
                    years, at a time when Iraq should not have had such
                    munitions. The investigation of these rockets is still
                    proceeding. Iraq states that they were overlooked from
                    1991 from a batch of some 2,000 that were stored there
                    during the Gulf War. This could be the case.

                    They could also be the tip of a submerged iceberg. The
                    discovery of a few rockets does not resolve but rather
                    points to the issue of several thousands of chemical
                    rockets that are unaccounted for. The finding of the
                    rockets shows that Iraq needs to make more effort to
                    ensure that its declaration is currently accurate. 

                    During my recent discussions in
                    Baghdad, Iraq declared that it
                    would make new efforts in this
                    regard and had set up a
                    committee of investigation. Since
                    then it has reported that it has
                    found a further four chemical
                    rockets at a storage depot in Al
                    Taji. I might further mention that
                    inspectors have found at another
                    site a laboratory quantity of
                    thiodiglycol, a mustard gas
                    precursor.

                    Whilst I am addressing chemical
                    issues, I should mention a matter,
                    which I reported on Dec 19 2002,
                    concerning equipment at a civilian
                    chemical plant at Al Fallujah. Iraq
                    has declared that it had repaired
                    chemical processing equipment
                    previously destroyed under Unscom supervision, and had
                    installed it at Fallujah for the production of chlorine and
                    phenols. We have inspected this equipment and are
                    conducting a detailed technical evaluation of it. 

                    On completion, we will decide whether this and other
                    equipment that has been recovered by Iraq should be
                    destroyed. 

                    Biological weapons 

                    I have mentioned the issue of anthrax to the Council on
                    previous occasions and I come back to it as it is an
                    important one. Iraq has declared that it produced about
                    8,500 litres of this biological warfare agent, which it states
                    it unilaterally destroyed in the summer of 1991.

                    Iraq has provided little evidence for this production and
                    no convincing evidence for its destruction. There are
                    strong indications that Iraq produced more anthrax than it
                    declared, and that at least some of this was retained after
                    the declared destruction date. It might still exist. Either it
                    should be found and be destroyed under Unmovic
                    supervision or else convincing evidence should be
                    produced to show that it was, indeed, destroyed in 1991.
                    As I reported to the Council on 19 December last year,
                    Iraq did not declare a significant quantity, some 650 kg,
                    of bacterial growth media, which was acknowledged as
                    imported in Iraq’s submission to the Amorim panel in
                    February 1999. 

                    As part of its Dec 7 2002 declaration, Iraq resubmitted
                    the Amorim panel document, but the table showing this
                    particular import of media was not included. The absence
                    of this table would appear to be deliberate as the pages of
                    the resubmitted document were renumbered. In the letter
                    of 24 January to the President of the Council, Iraq’s
                    Foreign Minister stated that “all imported quantities of
                    growth media were declared”. 

                    This is not evidence. I note that the quantity of media
                    involved would suffice to produce, for example, about
                    5,000 litres of concentrated anthrax. 

                    Missiles 

                    I turn now to the missile sector. There remain significant
                    questions as to whether Iraq retained Scud-type missiles
                    after the Gulf War. Iraq declared the consumption of a
                    number of Scud missiles as targets in the development of
                    an anti-ballistic missile defence system during the 1980s. 

                    Yet no technical information has been produced about that
                    programme or data on the consumption of the missiles.
                    There has been a range of developments in the missile
                    field during the past four years presented by Iraq as
                    non-proscribed activities. We are trying to gather a clear
                    understanding of them through inspections and on-site
                    discussions.

                    Two projects in particular stand out. They are the
                    development of a liquid-fuelled missile named the Al
                    Samoud 2, and a solid propellant missile, called the Al
                    Fatah. Both missiles have been tested to a range in
                    excess of the permitted range of 150 km, with the Al
                    Samoud 2 being tested to a maximum of 183 km and the
                    Al Fatah to 161 km. Some of both types of missiles have
                    already been provided to the Iraqi Armed Forces even
                    though it is stated that they are still undergoing
                    development. 

                    The Al Samoud’s diameter was increased from an earlier
                    version to the present 760 mm. This modification was
                    made despite a 1994 letter from the executive chairman
                    of Unscom directing Iraq to limit its missile diameters to
                    less than 600 mm.

                    Furthermore, a November 1997 letter from the executive
                    chairman of Unscom to Iraq prohibited the use of engines
                    from certain surface-to-air missiles for the use in ballistic
                    missiles. During my recent meeting in Baghdad, we were
                    briefed on these two programmes. We were told that the
                    final range for both systems would be less than the
                    permitted maximum range of 150 km. These missiles
                    might well represent prima facie cases of proscribed
                    systems. 

                    The test ranges in excess of 150 km are significant, but
                    some further technical considerations need to be made,
                    before we reach a conclusion on this issue. In the mean
                    time, we have asked Iraq to cease flight tests of both
                    missiles. In addition, Iraq has refurbished its missile
                    production infrastructure. In particular, Iraq reconstituted
                    a number of casting chambers, which had previously been
                    destroyed under Unscom supervision. 

                                     They had been used in the
                                     production of solid-fuel missiles.
                                     Whatever missile system these
                                     chambers are intended for, they
                                     could produce motors for missiles
                                     capable of ranges significantly
                                     greater than 150 km. Also
                                     associated with these missiles and
                                     related developments is the
                                     import, which has been taking
                                     place during the last few years, of
                                     a number of items despite the
                                     sanctions, including as late as
                                     December 2002. Foremost
                    amongst these is the import of 380 rocket engines which
                    may be used for the Al Samoud 2.

                    Iraq also declared the recent import of chemicals used in
                    propellants, test instrumentation and, guidance and
                    control systems. These items may well be for proscribed
                    purposes. 

                    That is yet to be determined. What is clear is that they
                    were illegally brought into Iraq, that is, Iraq or some
                    company in Iraq, circumvented the restrictions imposed
                    by various resolutions. Mr President, I have touched upon
                    some of the disarmament issues that remain open and
                    that need to be answered if dossiers are to be closed and
                    confidence is to arise.

                    Which are the means at the disposal of Iraq to answer
                    these questions? I have pointed to some during my
                    presentation of the issues. Let me be a little more
                    systematic. Our Iraqi counterparts are fond of saying that
                    there are no proscribed items and if no evidence is
                    presented to the contrary they should have the benefit of
                    the doubt, be presumed innocent. Unmovic, for its part, is
                    not presuming that there are proscribed items and
                    activities in Iraq, but nor is it – or I think anyone else
                    after the inspections between 1991 and 1998 – presuming
                    the opposite, that no such items and activities exist in
                    Iraq. 

                    Presumptions do not solve the problem. Evidence and full
                    transparency may help. Let me be specific. Find the items
                    and activities Information provided by Member States
                    tells us about the movement and concealment of missiles
                    and chemical weapons and mobile units for biological
                    weapons production. 

                    We shall certainly follow up any credible leads given to us
                    and report what we might find as well as any denial of
                    access. So far we have reported on the recent find of a
                    small number of empty 122 mm warheads for chemical
                    weapons. Iraq declared that it appointed a commission of
                    inquiry to look for more. Fine. 

                    Why not extend the search to other items? Declare what
                    may be found and destroy it under our supervision? 

                    Find documents

                    When we have urged our Iraqi counterparts to present
                    more evidence, we have all too often met the response
                    that there are no more documents. All existing relevant
                    documents have been presented, we are told. All
                    documents relating to the biological weapons programme
                    were destroyed together with the weapons. 

                    However, Iraq has all the archives
                    of the Government and its various
                    departments, institutions and
                    mechanisms. It should have
                    budgetary documents, requests for
                    funds and reports on how they
                    have been used. It should also
                    have letters of credit and bills of
                    lading, reports on production and
                    losses of material. 

                    In response to a recent Unmovic
                    request for a number of specific
                    documents, the only new
                    documents Iraq provided was a
                    ledger of 193 pages which Iraq
                    stated included all imports from
                    1983 to 1990 by the Technical and Scientific Importation
                    Division, the importing authority for the biological
                    weapons programme. Potentially, it might help to clear
                    some open issues. 

                    The recent inspection find in the private home of a
                    scientist of a box of some 3,000 pages of documents,
                    much of it relating to the laser enrichment of uranium
                    support a concern that has long existed that documents
                    might be distributed to the homes of private individuals. 

                    This interpretation is refuted by the Iraqi side, which
                    claims that research staff sometimes may bring home
                    papers from their work places. On our side, we cannot
                    help but think that the case might not be isolated and that
                    such placements of documents is deliberate to make
                    discovery difficult and to seek to shield documents by
                    placing them in private homes.

                    Any further sign of the concealment of documents would
                    be serious. The Iraqi side committed itself at our recent
                    talks to encourage persons to accept access also to
                    private sites. There can be no sanctuaries for proscribed
                    items, activities or documents. A denial of prompt access
                    to any site would be a very serious matter. 

                    Find persons to give credible information: a list of
                    personnel 

                    When Iraq claims that tangible evidence in the form of
                    documents is not available, it ought at least to find
                    individuals, engineers, scientists and managers to testify
                    about their experience. Large weapons programmes are
                    moved and managed by people. Interviews with
                    individuals who may have worked in programmes in the
                    past may fill blank spots in our knowledge and
                    understanding. It could also be useful to learn that they
                    are now employed in peaceful sectors. These were the
                    reasons why Unmovic asked for a list of such persons, in
                    accordance with resolution 1441. 

                    Some 400 names for all biological and chemical weapons
                    programmes as well as their missile programmes were
                    provided by the Iraqi side. This can be compared to over
                    3,500 names of people associated with those past
                    weapons programmes that Unscom either interviewed in
                    the 1990s or knew from documents and other sources. 

                    At my recent meeting in Baghdad, the Iraqi side
                    committed itself to supplementing the list and some 80
                    additional names have been provided. 

                    Allow information through credible interviews 

                    In the past, much valuable information came from
                    interviews. There were also cases in which the
                    interviewee was clearly intimidated by the presence of
                    and interruption by Iraqi officials. This was the
                    background of resolution 1441’s provision for a right for
                    Unmovic and the IAEA to hold private interviews “in the
                    mode or location” of our choice, in Baghdad or even
                    abroad. 

                    To date, 11 individuals were asked for interviews in
                    Baghdad by us. The replies have invariably been that the
                    individual will only speak at Iraq’s monitoring directorate
                    or, at any rate, in the presence of an Iraqi official. This
                    could be due to a wish on the part of the invited to have
                    evidence that they have not said anything that the
                    authorities did not wish them to say. 

                    At our recent talks in Baghdad, the Iraqi side committed
                    itself to encourage persons to accept interviews “in
                    private”, that is to say alone with us. Despite this, the
                    pattern has not changed. However, we hope that with
                    further encouragement from the authorities,
                    knowledgeable individuals will accept private interviews,
                    in Baghdad or abroad. 

                    Unmovic’s capability 

                    Mr President, I must not conclude this “update” without
                    some notes on the growing capability of Unmovic. In the
                    past two months, Unmovic has built-up its capabilities in
                    Iraq from nothing to 260 staff members from 60
                    countries. 

                    This includes approximately 100 Unmovic inspectors, 60
                    air operations staff, as well as security personnel,
                    communications, translation and interpretation staff,
                    medical support, and other services at our Baghdad office
                    and Mosul field office. All serve the United Nations and
                    report to no one else. 

                    Furthermore, our roster of inspectors will continue to grow
                    as our training programme continues - even at this
                    moment we have a training course in session in Vienna.
                    At the end of that course, we shall have a roster of about
                    350 qualified experts from which to draw inspectors. A
                    team supplied by the Swiss government is refurbishing