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PSC 371: Seminar in World Politics & Terrorism

Lecture Notes:

Howard & Sawyer (eds), 2004,  Terrorism & Counter Terrorism:

Understanding the New Security Environment, 2/e.

by Prof. Jeremy Lewis, revised 25 Oct. 2007.
Contents:
Part I: Defining the Threat
Ch. 1. Terrorism Defined
Ch. 2: Why Terrorism?
Ch. 3: The New Terrorism
Ch. 4: Religion & The Intersection with Terrorism
Ch. 5: Weapons of Mass Destruction
Ch. 6: The Threat of Other Forms of Terrorism
Part II: Countering the New Terrorist Threat
Ch. 7: The Challenges of Terrorism to a Free Society
Ch. 8: Strategies & Approaches for Combating Terrorism
Ch. 9: Organizing to Fight Terrorism
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Part I: Defining the Threat
Ch. 1. Terrorism Defined
  • What is terrorism?  What is counter terrorism?  Who is a terrorist?
  • Why do these questions matter?
    • 1.1 Bruce Hoffman, from "Defining Terrorism," Inside Terrorism (Columbia University Press, 1998)
  • Bruce Hoffman, "Defining Terrorism"
  • RAND specialist
  • evolution, beginning with French revolution
  • Russian anarchist bombings
  • violence, political cause, psychological goal of fear
  • comparison with insurgency, guerrilla action, criminal violence
  • Paul K. Pillar, "The Dimensions of Terrorism & Counterterrorism"

    • 1.2 Paul R. Pillar, from "The Dimensions of Terrorism and Counterterrorism," Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Brookings Institution Press, 2001)
  • Soldier & CIA officer.
  • Lists dimensions of terrorism, questions narrower definitions, expands to criminal terrorism and gangs of one.
  • CT needs broader approach, integration into foreign policy
  • Eqbal Ahmad & David Barsamian, Terrorism: Theirs & Ours"

    • 1.3 Eqbal Ahmad and David Barsamian, from Terrorism: Theirs & Ours (Seven Stories Press, 2001)
  • Pakistani, influenced by violence of partition of India, 1947
  • Questions Reagan's distinction between freedom fighters and terrorists, between PLO and Zionists.
  • Terrorism characterized by change, former allies (OBL) become terrorists, and former terrorists become allies (Begin).
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    Ch. 2: Why Terrorism?
  • What motivates terrorists?
  • Martha Crenshaw, "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice"

    • 2.1 Martha Crenshaw, from "The Logic of Terrorism: Terrorist Behavior as a Product of Strategic Choice," in Walter Reich, ed., Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1998)
  • Terrorism is a perfectly rational and logical choice for some.
  • Difficulty is to decide when Tm is a better strategy for radical groups than alternatives.
    • Audrey Kurth Cronin, "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism"
  • 2.2 Audrey Kurth Cronin, from "Behind the Curve: Globalization and International Terrorism," International Security (Winter 2002/2003)
  • Tm is not only a reaction to globalization but also facilitated by globalization
  • US response has been reactive and anachronistic
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    Ch. 3: The New Terrorism
    3.1 Brigadier General Russell D. Howard (Ret.), from “Understanding Al Qaeda’s Application of the New Terrorism—The Key to Victory in the Current Campaign,” An Original Essay Written for This Volume (2003)
    • eight ways in which new Tm differs from old, cold war period
    • better financed
    • more violent,
    • operate globally
    • better trained
    • more difficult to penetrate,
    • have access to and claim will use WMD
    • victory will be elusive: no surrender or armistice, no imprisonment of all members
    • present Tts have many advantages over older form


    3.2 John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, from "Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism," in Ian O. Lesser, John Arquilla, Bruce Hoffman, David Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini and Brian Jenkins, Countering the New Terrorism (RAND Corporation, 1999)

    • new, more complex form of Tm
    • netwar and cyberwar will attack modern societies' vulnerabilities
    3.3 Rohan Gunaratna, from “Post-Madrid Face of Al Qaeda,” The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2004)
     
  • 3.4 Matthew Levitt, from “Untangling the Terror Web: Identifying and Counteracting the Phenomenon of Crossover Between Terrorist Groups,” SAIS Review (Winter 2004)
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    Ch. 4: Religion & The Intersection with Terrorism
    4.1 Magnus Ranstorp, from "Terrorism in the Name of Religion," Journal of International Affairs (Summer 1996)
    • religious Tm is rising dramatically and is more intense
    • diversity: need to understand the individual groups
    4.2 Mark Juergensmeyer, from "The Logic of Religious Violence," in David C. Rapoport, ed., Inside Terrorist Organizations (Columbia University Press, 1988)
    • Sikhism shows some religions propel faithfully more easily into violence
    • Sikhism has much symbolism of violence
    • Sikh militants' struggle unlimited: continued after Indira Gandhi made concesssions
    • other religions' fundamental beliefs also could support Tm
    4.3 Mark Sedgwick, from “Al-Qaeda and the Nature of Religious Terrorism,” Terrorism and Political Violence (Winter 2004)
    4.4 Quintan Wiktorowicz, from “A Genealogy of Radical Islam,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (vol. 28, 2005)
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    Ch. 5: Weapons of Mass Destruction
    5.1 Richard K. Betts, from "The New Threat of Mass Destruction," Foreign Affairs (January/February 1998)
    • classic article argues core interest of protecting US homeland from attack is at odds with spreading American values abroad, westernization, globalization
    5.2 Adam Dolnik, from “All God’s Poisons: Re-Evaluating the Threat of Religious Terrorism with Respect to Non-Conventional Weapons,” Monterey Institute International Studies Report Prepared for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (2003)
    • religious groups not really more likely to use WMD
    • narrow minded, like secular Tts, who fail to see alternative perspectives
    5.3 Richard F. Pilch, from “The Bioterrorist Threat in the United States,” Monterey Institute International Studies Report Prepared for the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (2003)
    • formalizes formula for bioterrorist threat to US
    • Threat = Vulnerability x Capability x Intent
    • emphasizes major hurdles in acquiring, producing and delivering a potential bio warfare agent.
    • crop-duster case study
    • chance is small -- but must take worst-case scenario seriously.


    5.4 Michael Eastman and Robert B. Brown, from "Security Strategy in the Gray Zone: Alternatives for Preventing WMD Handoff to Non-State Actors," Defeating Terrorism (2003)

    • 3 strategies of deterrence, prevention and preemption
    • must begin with preventing hostile states from acquiring WMD
    • best of threee bad options
    5.5 John Ellis, from “Terrorism in the Genomic Age,” Terrorism and Counterterrorism (2003)
    • OBL funded genetic effort to alter super poppy for super heroin
    • breaking DNA code, despite many benefits, will allow bio terrorism to develop
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    Ch. 6: The Threat of Other Forms of Terrorism
    6.1 Barry R. McCaffrey and John A. Basso, from "Narcotics, Terrorism and International Crime: The Convergence Phenomenon," An Original Essay Written for This Volume
    • evidence from different world regions supports notion of narcoterrorism
    • insidious and debilitating form of Tm
    6.2 Bruce Hoffman, from “The Logic of Suicide Terrorism,” The Atlantic Monthly (June 2003)
    • tactics of T are also very logical
    • benefit /cost analysis
    • suicide bombings are inexpensive and effective:
    • the ultimate smart bomb
    • guarantee media coverage
    • less complicated and compromising than other forms
    • case studies of Israel, most common target so far
    • US can take precautions based on Israel's experience
    6.3 Ami Pedahzur, from “Toward an Analytical Model of Suicide Terrorism—A Comment,” Terrorism and Political Violence (Winter 2004)
    • comments on Pape's and Bloom's logics of suicide bombing
    • three part model of suicide bombing
    • begins with rational decision making among the organization's elites
    • concludes with explosion of suicide terrrorist
    6.4 Madeleine Gruen, from “Terrorism Indoctrination and Radicalization on the Internet,” An Original Essay Written for This Volume
    • Tts mastery of internet usage to expand Tts sphere of influence
    • propagation of ideology, recruitment, etc
    • govts must defend by using internet for CT
    6.5 Chris Dishman, from “The Leaderless Nexus: When Crime and Terror Converge,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (vol. 28, 2005)
    • shift from hierarchical to more leaderless, diverse organizations is happening also among criminals
    • "leaderless nexus" among T and criminal groups
    • more flexible operating environment
    • complicates CT
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    Part II: Countering the New Terrorist Threat
     

    Ch. 7: The Challenges of Terrorism to a Free Society
    7.1 Richard K. Betts, from "The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy: Tactical Advantages of Terror," Political Science Quarterly (2002)
    • strategy flows from coincidence to two conditions:
      • intense political grievance
      • gross imbalance of power
    • T becomes instrumentally appealling by default: party lacks other military options
    • the premier form of asymmetric warfare
    7.2 Bruce Hoffman, from "A Nasty Business," The Atlantic Monthly (January 2002)
    • difficult to gather intelligence on T, involves brutish methods
    • questions the limitations on interrogations and torture
    • how much of rights & freedoms can we sacrifice for intell?
    7.3 Boaz Ganor, from "Dilemmas Concerning Media Coverage of Terrorist Attacks," The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle, A Guide for Decision Makers (Transaction Publishers, 2005)
    • dilemma of needing to report the events (PRTK)
    • T benefits from media coverage
    • case of Israel
    7.4 Mark Basile, from "Going to the Source: Why Al Qaedas, Financial Network Is Likely to Withstand the Current War on Terror Financing," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2004)
    • AQ has sophisticated funds transfer systems
    • almost impossible to stop T financing
    • 3 reasons for centrality of funding as a target for CT
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    Ch. 8: Strategies & Approaches for Combating Terrorism
    8.1 General Wayne A. Downing (Ret.), from "The Global War on Terrorism: Re-focusing the National Strategy," An Original Essay Written for This Volume
    • multinational, multilateral approach is essential
    • refocus national strategy to acknowledge changing nature of the threat
    • strive to limit T scope, lethality and means
    • reduce T to local threat for law enforcement to deal with
    8.2 Brigadier General Russell D. Howard (Ret.), from "Preemptive Military Doctrine: No Other Choice," An Original Essay Written for This Volume (2005)
    • deterrence & containment, the previous strategy, no longer valid
    • now confronting transnational, non-state Ts.
    • agrees with Pres. W. Bush, US must confront T abroad
    • if necessary, act alone, & with preemptive force
    • traditional levers of economic, political, diplomatic & mil -- not effective against NGOs.
    • no way to sanction or negotiate, no way to deter OBL
    8.3 Barry R. Posen, from "The Struggle Against Terrorism: Grand Strategy, Strategy, and Tactics," International Security (Winter 2001/02)
    • US needs comprehensive strategy of selective engagement
    • SOF are ideal tool
      • flexible, fast, and relatively discriminate forces
      • US has large SOF well suited to CT mission
    8.4 Paul R. Pillar, from “Counterterrorism after Al Qaeda,” The Washington Quarterly (Summer 2004)
    • senior CIA official, T scholar
    • describes new, decentralized, AQ, post 2001
    • disparate and dispersed enemy from any corner of radicalized Islam
    • need international cooperation to address the threat
    8.5 Steven Simon and Jeff Martini, from "Terrorism: Denying Al Qaeda Its Popular Support," The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2004/2005)
    • deny AQ popular support, critical to their continuation
    • need broader approach
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    Ch. 9: Organizing to Fight Terrorism
    9.1 Martha Crenshaw, from "Counterterrorism Policy and the Political Process," Studies in Conflict & Terrorism (2001)
    • pressures from Congress will prevent President from coherent CT strategy
    • also rivalries among agencies will prevent coherent strategy
    • (written pre-9/11, highly prescient?)
    9.2 Rob de Wijk, from "The Limits of Military Power," The Washington Quarterly (Winter 2002)
    • West's forces are fundamentally flawed: convention forces for unconventional war
    • not enough SOF
    • wil need hearts & minds campaign to win over T supporters
    9.3 Richard H. Shultz, Jr., from "Showstoppers: Nine Reasons Why We Never Sent Our Special Operations Forces After Al Qaeda Before 9/11," The Weekly Standard (January 26, 2004)
    • author is security studies director at Fletcher School, Tufts U.
    • Interviews post 9/11 with many leading participants in DOD and elsewhere
    • SOF attacks on AQ before 9/11 were blocked by 9 factors:
        • 1. Terrorism as crime (though it did bring back individual bombers)
          SOF was defined out of action
        2. Not a clear and present danger or war
          acts of war, but had been perpetrated by non state actors
        3. Somalia Syndrome
        4. no legal authority for covert ops under 10 USC, and under 50 USC, CIA has the authority.
        5. Risk Aversion -- even in DOD
        6. Pariah cowboys -- JCS characterization of NSC's CSG under Dick Clarke
        7. Intimidation of civilians -- by JCS in Clinton administration
        8. Big footprints -- SOF trains to fight in small packages
    • Theme is Rumsfeld was unable to change culture at DOD, mistrustful of SOF.
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    Appendices
    Appendix A Background Information on Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations
    Appendix B Chronology of Significant Terrorist Incidents, 2002-2004