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PSC 371: Seminar in 3rd World Politics & Terrorism
A Declaration of War - In 1998, when interviewed Bin Ladin claimed it was more important for Muslims to kill Americans than other infidels: fatwa issued
- Plans to attack the United States were developed throughout the 1990’s
- Bin Ladin and Al Qaeda say America attacked Islam and America is responsible for all conflicts involving Muslims
- In the 1990’s, the Iranian revolution lost momentum, prestige and public support, and Pakistan’s rulers found most of its population had little enthusiasm for fundamentalist IslamThe Rise of Bin Ladin and Al Qaeda - A decade of conflict in Afghanistan, 1979-1989, rallying point and training field
- "Golden Chain", Ladin’s financial support network, US & Saudi funding Mujahadeen in Afghanistan
- World wide network
- Bin Ladin had access to family fortune
- Bin Ladin soon took over the Taliban in 1996
- 1998 2 US embassies bombed in East Africa, injuring 5,000
1993 first WTC bombing; FBI responded well by law enforcement means, under single field office command tradition 1991 CT reorganization at FBI did not succeed 1978 Congress passed Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act which regulated intelligence collection. 1995 Janet Reno issued formal procedures on sharing of intelligence between the intelligence side of the house to the criminal side. FBI perceived could not share intell with criminal law side 1997-98, a "watchlist" was created FAA concerned with sabotage, not CT, did not receive intell, did not enforce locked cockpit door rule CIA & NSA surveillance both more alert to CT, but cuts post cold war, controls post watergate State & Defense had global databases but systems had holes, deterrence not designed for non-state enemies Presidency increasing concern with CT Iran-Contra affair made bureaucracy skeptical about directives from White House. Congress used external commissions instead of own work, ignored their many recommendations unclear whether presidency needed congressional authority on CT
1993 Bin Ladin was put on the TIPOFF watchlist 1997 no policy with regards to Afghanistan Pakistan/India civil war main focus in region U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, & Dar es Salaam, Tanzania were bombed. This led to the firing of cruise missiles, none of which killed Bin Ladin. Lewinsky scandal a distraction Diplomacy: little success pressing Taliban & Pakistan to give up Bin Ladin Intelligence: shared with Saudi, US agents interrogated Saudi prisoners Covert: Clinton memo of notification: CIA to use tribal assets to capture Bin Ladin Never got actionable intelligence on Bin Ladin's location, even in 1999 when very close July 1999 authorized CIA to collaborate with governments and Northern Alliance to capture OBL.
Terrorist Entrepreneurs Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was the principal architect of 9/11 attacks, & involved in the first World Trade Center Bombing, was captured in 2003. Jemaah Islamiah (JI) cooperated with AQ in Indonesia, but not under OBL command Only part of KSM's 9/11 operation proceeded, because of practical difficulties in EAst Asia Frankfurt jihadists fluent in English; all trained in Afghan by KSM, most concealed radicalization at home. cost under half $M, funded by AQ, jihadists inserted to US from 2000 onwards, leaving money trail
Millennium Crisis, arrests of plotters in Jordan, CIA surveilling OBL, FBI communicative March 2000 CIA knew one plotter flew to Los Angeles, but only CTC was told CIA needed more funding after milliennial surveillance, need to disrupt AQ fundraising principals agreed on border controls 2000 Clinton spoke on improving covert action 2000 Attack on USS Cole, needed intell before reprisals CTC wanted support of Afghan & Uzbek tribes, anti-Taliban groups 2001, Bush admin: Condi Rice shifted priorities to China, missile defence, middle east peace process collapse, & Persian Gulf. 3 phase strategy: ultimatum to Taliban, diplomatic pressure, covert action, international coalition -- if not, covert action. September 2001 Clarke sent Rice a strong note criticizing U.S. counterterrorism efforts of past and present. Predator search for OBL seen ineffective, new plan needed
early 2000, KSM led first jihadists to California, to study English before learning to fly, some difficulties in both Summer 2000: Hamburg group learned to fly in Florida, others in Arizona only one, Mindhar, did not stay in country Dec. 2000 pilots completed training Muscle hijackers from Saudi learned self defense in gyms and opened bank accounts Atta was told in Spain of OBL's desire for quick strikes (after Sharon's provocative visit to Temple Mount), & made plans for each plane's group. teams based on few with English skills Evidence shows Iran facilitated AQ transfers from Afghan second wave of attacks dropped for lack of pilots
2001: CIA daily presidential briefings on OBL threats Spring 2001 highest terror threat since Millennium alert, then higher still in summer August 6, 2001, the CIA issued a report during the Presidential Daily Briefing, “Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in the US.” It was the 36th PDB item in 2001, first to mention US as specific target. July 27 Clarke informed Rice and Hadley that the threat of the al Qaeda attack had ended. 9/11 attacks fell in the void between foreign and domestic threats -- US was protecting its installations abroad, mostly 3 Mistakes, when govt ran out of time and failed to see connections: Mihdhar, who left US when homesick, was still issued US visa. FBI memo from Phoenix to HQ warned of OBL's flight students -- but not read till later. FBI investigation on Moussaoui who was thought to be planning to hijack a plane. The FBI sought to end his flight training and issue a deportation order. The investigation failed to search his laptop computer.
Port Auth had improved emrgency facilities at WTC after 1993, if not procedures NYPD commissioner had operational authority when needed NYFD commissioner lacked operational authority Mayor's Office of Emergency Management: monitor comms; improve city's capability for major incidents; manage city's overall response On 9/11: enormous volume of calls, dispatchers lacked info, lacked location of callers. FDNY responded immediately Police and Port Auth closed bridges & tunnels N. Tower upper floor sprinklers failed Port Auth quickly ordered evacuation of WTC FD mobilized 2000 after second plane hit improvised, lack of rooftop rescue procedures, lack of control of local units, lack of effective comms
WH: temporary "domestic consequences" group created a checklist for future crisis planners Pakistan immediately agreed to war on terrorism Sec. Powell received numerous offers of aid, SAR & medical teams Wolfowitz called for attack against Iraq as source of terrorism Phase 2: air strikes and SOF attacks on AQ & Taliban, CIA & SOF together Dec. 2001: all cities in hands of coalition, killed quarter of AQ known leaders.
generational challenge is to view terrorism as threat at home, not just abroad specific focus on Islamist terrorism -- not some generic evil. Tripod: attack terrorists and their organizations includes Pakistan as muslim ally make Afghanistan stable & secure confront Saudi about past & present problems prevent growth of Islamist terrorism; encourage reform & democracy for muslims multilateralism, US to accept help from others protect against terrorist attacks. 500 million border crossings legally, 500K illegally -- needs travel intell tighten up on identity fraud screen for explosives
Five major recommendations: National Counter terrorism Center against Islamist threat. National Intelligence Director to unify intelligence on Islamist threat Network-based information sharing system for CT agencies unifying congressional oversight on this topic strengthening FBI and Homeland Defenders