Moral considerations in foreign policy are largely derived from what is good for the state and its place in international politics. Balance of power politics predominates and all states are trying to maximize their own power and standing. On the other hand, the idealist approach assumes that the nation-state is only one of the many participants in foreign policy, and that values, rather than interests, are predominant in shaping foreign policy.
Social and economic issues are equally important as military ones. Overall global conditions, not state-to-state relations dominate foreign policy considerations. Universal values should be the basis of action, and improving humankind is a laudable goal. Foreign policy should be a cooperative process between state groups.
The Nixon administration was based upon the principles of the "balance
of power;" its approach was to be anchored in a global equilibrium among
the US, the Soviet Union, and China. Nixon stressed the importance of bringing
China back into the world community and the more limited role for the US
in regional disputes. The "Nixon Doctrine" was shaped by 3 principles after
the
US departure from Vietnam, which included that peace would require
strength to protect US national interests and the peace would require a
willingness to negotiate with all states. This meant that the power of
the US was to be shared with others to preserve world order. Nixon recognized
that the world was multipolar; he acknowledged that nationalism in the
developing world
should not be equated with in the increase in communist penetration.
For Henry Kissinger (who was at one time Nixon's national security advisor
and then his secretary of state), the problem in the postwar world was
the lack of a legitimate international order.
The US needed to develop some kind of order in a world that was bipolar
militarily but multipolar politically. Therefore, the US has to use
balance of power politics, in which stability is the fundamental goal.
To achieve this, competing powers should recognize the rights of one another;
states had to accept the rights and interest of other nations and contain
their revolutionary fervor. Deviations from respecting the rights and interests
of other states (i.e. attempts at expansion) would not go unpunished. There
were limitations of acceptable international behavior. The character of
behavior in one foreign policy arena was inevitably linked to the character
of behavior in another foreign policy arena.
However, Nixon and Kissinger did not link foreign and domestic arenas. The success of the strategy meant the abandonment by the US, USSR and China of universal goals of transforming international politics to their own ends. A policy of cooperation would be mixed with a policy of competition. This approach became labeled as "détente."
Kissinger believed that diplomacy was the key to the resolution of disputes. He was willing to negotiate outstanding differences between states. However, he believed in the use of force to achieve foreign policy goals. He felt that domestic values should not dominate American foreign policy. While human rights standards were perfectly acceptable in domestic politics, these standards were unacceptable in the conduct of foreign policy.
Domestic policies of a nation mattered less to Kissinger than the way that the nation treated the US in foreign affairs (relations between nations, not domestic conditions within nations).
The Strategic Arms Limitation talks (SALT) were signed by the US and USSR president Brezhnev in 1972. It consisted of the Interim Agreement on Offensive Strategic Arms (limitations on offensive nuclear weapons) and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (limited the development of defensive nuclear weapons systems). Also, the Moscow Summit meetings produced more than military accommodation; they included political, economic, and social/cultural arrangements. There was cooperation to improve trade relations and on undertaking joint space activities, among several other things.
The Shanghai communique resulted from Nixon's visit to China in 1972,
which resulted in an opening up of trade.
The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(also called the Helsinki Accords) signaled efforts at expanding détente
from involving only the superpowers to including all European states.
Kissinger saw negotiations as the key to the resolution of the Vietnam War. In an attempt to get the negotiations back on track, the escalation of force needed to be added to the diplomatic track. For Nixon and Kissinger, force could be used to demonstrate resolve concerning their bargaining position and to prod their adversary to serious negotiations. In his "shuttle diplomacy," Kissinger used his considerable diplomatic skills to negotiate a series of disengagement pacts among Egypt, Syria, and Israel.
During the Nixon administration, there appeared to be a separation between American domestic values and American foreign policy actions. Strategic considerations became an important motivating force for the Nixon administration. Domestic politics in any state were to be subordinated to the requirements of international politics. To the extent that domestic situations within another state were to be addressed, these were to be done through quiet diplomacy-secret representations to the offending regime.
There were criticisms of the Nixon and Kissinger approach from both
the left and the right and also the foreign policy establishment. Kissinger's
concern with order and stability i international politics ignored the more
important
questions of peace and justice in global affairs. Conservative viewed the
policy of détente as morally bankrupt because it gave legitimacy
and equality to regimes to which the US had not done so in the past.
It had the effect of reducing the ideological distinction between the US
and the communist states. George Ball charged that their style of policy
making was inappropriate for a great power and for a democratic society.
Their approach was built on secrecy and personalism that were hardly consistent
with a
democratic society. By tradition, policies, and their rationales, must
be fully explained to the American public. US policy had indeed moved away
from an emphasis on both moral principle and isolationism; instead it had
embraced the basic elements of realism.
On the other hand, President Carter sought to reorient the focus of America's foreign policy away from a singular emphasis on adversaries and toward a policy with a truly global emphasis. He highlighted the importance of domestic values as a guide to American foreign policy. He felt that America should serve as a model for other nations. He also called for a different style of foreign policy-one that would be open and candid. He acknowledged that the US would have to try to produce change rather than impose it.
The policy of global cooperation recognized the reality of the new states
and their place in the world order. Crucial regional trouble spots (Mid
East, southern Africa, Panama Canal) were to have a high priority. Carter
sought to improve relations with America's traditional friends, including
Western Europe and Japan (which because of Kissinger's realism had suffered
some fissures). With the Soviet Union, Carter was committed to joint
efforts at strategic arms control. However, the broad comprehensive détente
approach of the previous administrations would not be the aim. The heart
of international politics in this period had moved beyond the US and USSR
bilateral relationship. America's emphasis was now on moral principle and
on
globalism and on human rights. America would require states to change
their domestic human rights behavior if they wished amicable relations
with the US.
The human rights issue appealed across the political spectrum and thus
would be domestically attractive. President Carter was determined to redefine
the national interest to make it coincide with the moral impulse. The US
must evoke a global order through it actions. The human rights notion was
broadened from the humane treatment of individuals to include political,
economic, and social rights. Aid (and particularly military aid) was cut
off to principal offender nations. But the primary instrument used was
diplomatic "jawboning"-publicly and privately bringing to the attention
of the foreign govts American dissatisfaction with
their human rights practices. However, there was a problem with the
policy's selective application. On the one hand, the US called for the
free exercise of human rights, but on the other, the US provided economic
and military assistance to nations often cited as having serious human
rights violations.
Quiet efforts were necessary to pursue human rights in the international
system. More significantly though, American prestige in various areas of
the world was enhanced. As a result, a more receptive attitude toward American
initiatives was forthcoming throughout the world, and especially within
the developing world. The human rights campaign also caused friction with
friendly, but human right deficient, nations. (Nonintervention in internal
affairs, by contrast, had been the benchmark of the détente approach
that evolved under the Nixon-Ford-Kissinger administration.)
The essential aim of the Carter administration was to downgrade the dominance of the Soviet-American relationship in the foreign policy and to concentrate efforts primarily on the other areas of the world. If global problems were addressed, global intrusions by the Soviets would be much less likely, and the USSR would be contained. However, the Soviets would not allow the US to downgrade their centrality to global politics.
For more than two decades, the US had negotiated over the transfer of the Panama Canal and the Canal Zone to sole Panamanian sovereignty. In 1977, the Panama Canal Treaty, which called for the total transfer of Canal control to Panama by the year 2000, was signed.
In the Middle East, President Sadat of Egypt announced in 1977 that
he was willing to go to Jerusalem to seek peace. Prime Minister Begin of
Israel quickly issues an invitation. Three days of discussions broke the
impasse and raised hopes for real progress. However, by the summer of 1978,
an impasse had set in. President Carter invited President Sadat and Prime
Minister Begin to Camp David. "A Framework for Peace in the Middle
East" was agreed to by the two competing parties. Both adversaries attributed
the success of the Camp David meetings to the personal efforts of Jimmy
Carter.
Furthermore, in March 1979, a peace treaty- based on Camp David framework-
was signed between Egypt and Israel.
Formal diplomatic relations were established with the People's Republic
of China in 1979, although afterwards relations were broken with Taiwan.
This had the potential of easing conflicts in East Asia, and at the same time created another uncertainty in America's approach to its traditional adversary, the Soviet Union. It also reinforced the Soviet view that the Carter administration was more interested in dealing with other states than with it.
The American hostage crisis in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
however, once again brought the Soviet Union back into focus for America.
Carter's greatest policy challenge was the seizure and holding of more
than 50 Americans in the US embassy in Iran. Rather than trying to accommodate
Third World demands, the US took a variety of steps to rescue the
hostages (including a military rescue). The actions connoted a return
to a realist perspective in foreign policy. With the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan, Carter adopted the bilateral approach of the past, with the
Soviet-American relationship at the center of his policy making. A grain
embargo was imposed upon the USSR; ratification of the SALT II treaty was
shelved; America also boycotted the Moscow summer Olympics.
The greatest value change that the Nixon years brought to US policy was a movement away from the emphasis on moral principle and greater acceptance of traditional realism as the basis of actions toward the rest of the world. The Carter administration sought to continue the limited globalism of the Nixon years, but to change from the largely singular moral emphasis on anticommunism to a more comprehensive, morally based approach, best exemplified by its human rights campaign.
McCormick Ch. 4: Carter's
Idealism
Jarret Layson, Spring 2003
1. emphasizing domestic values-Zbigniew Brzezinski -principle foreign policy advisor, he felt that the greatest danger was internat'l anarchy
2. improving relations with allies
3. de-emphasizing the Soviet Union
4. promoting global human rights
-military aid cut-offApplication -selective application: hurt effectiveness
-economic aid used to encourage
-Panama CanalGlobal Events and Soviet-American Relations
-Middle East
-Rhodesia, Namibia, and S. Africa
-China
Whereas Carter attempted to move away from the power politics of the Kissinger era and away from a foreign policy that focused directly on adversaries, Reagan embraced the need for power and the need to focus on the Soviet Union and its expansionist policy. Bush came to office less as a foreign policy ideologue and more as a pragmatist without a strongly held worldview.
Unlike Bush, Reagan did have a strongly held worldview. Under Reagan,
the principal foreign policy goal of the US was to be the revival of the
national will to contain the Soviet Union. The US, in his judgment, remained
in a moral struggle with that nation. The Reagan administration quickly
called for an increase in military spending. The buildup was across the
entire military, although the strategic modernization plan attracted much
of the attention. Under this, each component of the nuclear triad would
be modernized (the land-based missiles, sea-based nuclear missiles, and
the intercontinental nuclear-armed bombers). Also the NATO alliance's Dual
Track decision proposed that new theater nuclear weapons would be deployed
in Western Europe if negotiations on theater nuclear arms control failed.
Also the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") was viewed as a further
escalation of the arms race; it was another effort to rebuild America's
military might and to confront Soviet power directly.
The reinvigoration of the allies meant basically to upgrade the military
strength of the West and to have the allies support the
political leadership of the US globally. The US wanted the Europeans
and the Japanese to accept a greater defense burden in their corresponding
regions.
Reagan challenged the developing world to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps and to seek improvement through the efforts of private enterprise. Under the Caribbean Basin Initiative, preferential trade access to the American market for the Caribbean states and increased American investments in the region were the key development components.
There was also the increased reliance on military assistance as an "essential" element of US policy. The US would provide military assistance to its partners and to those nations with whom it has friendly and cooperative security relationship. The US would not endanger its own security by engaging in unilateral action to restrict the transfer of weapons abroad. Another shift in policy was that conflicts in the developing world had to be recast into the underlying global conflict that the Reagan administration saw in the world (they wouldn't be analyzed on the basis of regional concerns).
Only if the Soviet Union demonstrated restraint in its global actions
would the US carry on normal and reciprocal relations with it. Because
the Soviet Union had not done so in the past, the Reagan administration
did not seek to improve relations immediately. To demonstrate resolve,
the administration called for stockpiling the neutron bomb, and also failed
to move rapidly on arms control and to engage in summit meetings. However,
the US stated that it would continue to adhere to the SALT I and II limitations
if the Soviets would. By Nov 1983, the Soviets took a number of provocative
actions over the next few months to
show its displeasure with Reagan administration policy.
The Reagan administration issues a white paper outlining the danger
in El Salvador. Military assistance and the threat of military action were
used by the US govt to respond to the country's civil war. El Salvador
and Honduras became leading recipients of US foreign assistance. Also,
the Reagan administration had a clandestine operation in Honduras to support
the Nicaraguan Contras, who were opposed to the Sandinista govt.
In southern Africa, Reagan adopted a policy of "constructive engagement."
Since South Africa was anti-Communist, the US could not seek a confrontational
approach toward it. However, the conflict in the region really had East-West
overtones that could not be overlooked. In the Middle East, there was not
much effort to proceed with the Camp David framework. Instead, Reagan attempted
to rally the Arab states against the Soviet Union and to engage the Israelis
in a strategic understanding. The administration became immersed in local
(not global) issues in the Middle East, and as a result, had to respond
to local
issues. The administration sought to negotiate a cease-fire between
the Israelis and the surrounded Palestinian forces. Even President Reagan
moved into a mediator posture in a new initiative labeled the Reagan Initiative
to serve as a follow-up to the Camp David framework.
There were some foreign policy differences between Europe and the US, however. The Europeans were more concerned with preserving contacts with Eastern Europe, not disrupting them. They were uneasy with Reagan's commitment to pursuing negotiations with the Soviet Union seriously. With his harsh rhetoric, his strategic modernization plan, and his reluctance to proceed quickly with arms control talks, Reagan did not seem to be following a policy of arms restraint. There were also challenges inside the US as well. The nuclear freeze movement within the US gained quick public support. People were uspicious of the number of Americans being sent to Central America. The fear of another Vietnam caused Secretary of State Haig to rule out the use of American troops in Central America.
While Reagan promised that his second term would be like the first,
there were some changes. The new Secretary of State George Shultz indicated
that the Soviet Behavior in all areas of the world would not automatically
be linked to the quality of relations between the Soviet Union and the
US. He summarized the principal US foreign policy goal as being based on
negotiation and strength simultaneously to build a stable US-Soviet relationship.
In 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev was selected as the
general secretary of the Communist party in the USSR; eventually he
was president. He brought a commitment to improving relations with the
US.
He wanted to restructure the Soviet society to improve the economy (perestroika)
and have a new "openness" and movement toward greater democratization within
the Soviet system (glasnost). Because of this, nuclear arms accommodation
between the two superpowers became a viable option. The Soviet leadership
indicated that the struggle between capitalism and socialism had changed,
and political solutions, rather than military ones, ought to be pursued.
The new accommodation with the Soviet Union was a result of the increasing
domestic burden of sustained military spending, as well as a change of
the policy of the US and the
new thinking within the Soviet Union. Reagan ultimately held more summits
(5 total) with Soviet leaders than any other American
president. There were significant advances for a strategic arms reduction
(START) agreement. The Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was completed
as the third summit. The INF Treaty called for the elimination of all immediate-range
nuclear weapons within 3 yrs and all medium-range nuclear weapons within
18 months. It also prohibited the US and USSR from ever again possessing
such weapons. The Treaty also established a Special Verification Commission,
which would be continuously in session to deal with any issues that may
arise. The INF Treaty represented the first nuclear arms reduction pact
in human
history. However, each superpower retained a formidable arsenal with
which to destroy one another and the world at large.
The "Reagan Doctrine" was a policy of supporting anti-Communist movement around the world. Several anti-Communist movements across 3 continents received both covert and overt American economic and military assistance and political encouragement in their fights against Communist govts in power.
The Reagan administration supported the Nicaraguan Contras fighting
against the Sandinista govt in various ways, including the use of US clandestine
assistance. President Reagan decided to reverse the long-standing policy
of an arms embargo against Iran in an attempt to free US hostages. Since
Congress cut off all military assistance to the Nicaraguan Contras, Reagan
decided to support them through the clandestine sale of arms to the Iranian
govt and the transfer of profits to the Nicaraguan rebels. Throughout everything,
President Reagan denied both that he knew that the arms sales profits were
being transferred to the Contras and that the arms sales to Iran were tied
solely to the freeing of American hostages held in Lebanon. The activities
were never reported to Congress; Congress was misled and dishonesty and
excessive secrecy pervaded the process. The Iran-Contra
affair damaged both the clarity and credibility of the administration's
policy. It resulted in 2 investigations--one by the executive branch (Tower
Commission) and the other by Congress.
The Reagan administration also changed policies in the movement toward democracy in the Philippines. The administration threw its full support behind the opposition candidate, Corazon Aquina, and informed Ferdinand Marcos that he should resign. The US had long supported Marcos principally because of his anti-Communist credentials. This represented a clear departure from previous policy, away from maintaining stability through support for authoritarian rule and toward the promotion of human rights and democracy.
A shift in American policy also occurred when the US recognized the PLO. The US had pledged to Israel that it would have no contact with the PLO unless some conditions were met, including that the PLO would have to renounce the use of terrorism. Yasir Arafat, head of the PLO, announced his full acceptance of the conditions for US-PLO dialogue and his renunciation of terrorism. Within a matter of hours, Reagan announced a shift in American policy.
Although all American administrations had long opposed South Africa's apartheid, the Reagan administration had followed a policy of "constructive engagement" in which "quiet diplomacy" was seen as the best way to elicit change in that strategically important country. As a more tangible way to effect change, though Reagan issued an executive order imposing economic. Afterwards Congress passed a new, tough sanctions bill, the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986 over President Reagan's veto.
President Bush did not come to office with a grand design for reshaping
international politics. Instead, his administration's approach really reflected
the values, beliefs, and temperament of Bush himself, a moderate, middle-of-the-road
professional politician who was well trained in foreign affairs. Bush's
underlying political philosophy might best be summarized in this away:
Getting results are more important than claiming ideological victory; getting
results are the best way to achieve political success. His administration
was much more interested in relations with the strong (USSR and China)
than the weak. Also, he was actively involved in the policy making. Policy
decisions generally lent credence to this pragmatic, cautious--yet realist--description
of the Bush administration's approach to foreign policy. The key positions
in the administration were individuals without strong ideological posture
but given to practical solutions to problems. A danger existed that few
dissenters resided within the inner
circle of advisors, however the personal Bush strategy of consulting
widely diminished the potency of this criticism.
President Bush outlined a number of changes in Soviet foreign policy that the US would seek. First, the Soviet Union must change some of its global commitments. It must also demonstrate a substantial commitment to political pluralism and human rights. If these actions were undertaken, he would support a renewal of the "open skies" policy between the two nations. Also, as soon as the USSR would reform its emigration laws, the US would free up trade between the two countries. Also, Bush reaffirmed the commitment to a strong national security strategy. The US was to maintain an effective nuclear deterrent but would also show a renewed commitment to arms control and arms reductions in both conventional and nuclear weapons.
In Cambodia, the Bush administration withdrew its support from the 3 parties opposed to the Vietnamese-supported govt and agreed to have direct talks with the Vietnamese govt over the future of Cambodia. This strategy was formulated in cooperation with the Soviet Union. Within 2 months, the 4 competing parties in Cambodia committed themselves to using the UN framework for settling the conflict.
In China, thousands of pro-democracy demonstrators were killed by the Chinese military. The US immediately imposed a series of economic sanctions, stopped arms sales, suspended visits between US and Chinese military officials, and offered humanitarian and medical assistance to those injured. However, global realities compelled the US to pursue a foreign policy based upon continued contact with the Beijing govt in an effort to affect its actions. Political realism, not domestic moral principles, guided the actions of the Bush administration.
In the space of less than two years, the Soviet Empire collapsed, most of the states of Eastern Europe moving from socialist to capitalist and from non-democratic to democratic, Germany was reunified, and the Soviet Union itself was dissolved. Initially reform efforts were undertaken largely within the limits of maintaining a modified Socialist system.
The efforts at democratic political reform within were essential parts of Gorbachev's implementation of glasnost and perestroika, the mechanism for making the country more efficient and competitive globally. A group of hard-line Communist party members and govt officials seized power briefly. However, the coup collapsed quickly (in only 3 days). Ironically the coup attempt had the effect of pressuring for even greater reform within the Soviet Union and further weakening the central govt. On December 25, 1991, the Soviet Union was formally dissolved.
Throughout the period of change, the Bush administration was largely an interested spectator. The US sought to refrain from any actions that might appear as "gloating." The principal policy response was to provide some economic assistance to the new democracies and to encourage other European states to do so as well. Congress approved an aid package to aid efforts to stabilize the economy and foster private enterprise. Now that Germany's fully sovereignty was restored, other states (including the US) would necessarily lose some of their rights over German territory. The USSR and the US signed a declaration of nonaggression between the two sides to end, officially, the Cold War in 1990.
Now that the Cold War was over, the future direction of the US, according
to Bush, was to build "a new world order." The emphasis on traditional
values was coupled with a commitment to sustained American involvement.
Bush envisioned an order grounded in the cooperation of all states and
based upon greater involvement of the collective security actions of the
United Nations.
Chap. 6: THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION:
FOREIGN POLICY AFTER THE COLD WAR
(Tiffany Tolbert, 2001)
The Clinton administration was determined to have a foreign policy rooted in a clear set of principles, derived from America's past and guided by a coherent and workable strategy, appropriate to the end of the Cold War.
Key Foreign Policy Principles
Idealism would be fused back into American
foreign policy
Economic security of the United States
Flexible defense
Promotion of democracy
The Economic Security of the United States
To achieve this end of economic security.....the
Clinton administration under took several key
domestic measures to improve foreign economic
competitiveness and complete two major foreign
initiative as well.
They would develop
a domestic economic program making American companies and American
workers more
productive and more competitive abroad
It would seek
to put in place a strategy to reduce U.S. foreign borrowing to support
its budget
deficits
It would take
the necessary action to make America a more reliable and capable trading
partner
The strategy would require rapid completion
and implementation of two important international
economic agreements. (they were then under
discussion)
Completion of
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to create a more open
trading order
in the Western Hemisphere.
The Completion
of the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations among 117 nations
This pact would systematically lower tariff and non tariff barriers on
global trade
A Strong, Flexible Defense
Needed to maintain a strong, but more flexible,
defense to meet both new and continuing security
challenges.
Deterrence would
remain an important function of the armed services
America's defenses
would also need to be prepared to meet new threats and undertake new
missions
The Promotion of Democracy
During the campaign, Bill Clinton promised
to place a greater emphasis on promoting democracy
abroad and attacked the Bush administration's
support of the "status quo."
Bush had sided
with the status quo rather than democratic change
Familiar tyrants than those who would overthrow them
With the old geography of repression rather than a new map of freedom
The Strategy of Enlargement
Commitment to Global Engagement
Some feared
that the U.S. was pursuing a "neo-isolationist" policy, the United States
would
stay engaged.
Unilateral or Collective Security
Whether the
United States would act alone to protect its national interest or rely
upon
collective security
mechanisms (e.g., the United Nations)
The Use of Force
The use of American
forces - an effort to clarify when they would be used, under what
conditions,
and under whose command
Some Policy Priorities
To identify
the policy priorities and the basic strategy to guide American foreign
policy
In February of 1995, Secretary Christopher
tried to articulate, once again, the guiding principles of the
Clinton administration's foreign policy approach.
A commitment
to be engaged and lead
A commitment
to cooperative relations with powerful nations
A commitment
to adapt and build economic a security institutions
A commitment
to support democracy and human rights
These principles would lead to focusing on five key areas of policy emphasis
Advancing the
most open global trading system in history
Developing a
new European security order
Helping achieve
a comprehensive peace in the Middle East
Combating the
spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
Fighting international
crime, narcotics and terrorism
POLICY ACTIONS OF THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION
Promoting American Economic Security
The Clinton administration was related to the
commitment to promote "economic security" and to wed
foreign policy and foreign economic policy.
NAFTA (The North
American Free Trade Agreement)
This was the Clinton administration's first step toward achieving its goal
of
greater economic security
It contained several key provisions for improving U.S. trade and investment
GATT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)
It passed almost exactly a year later, at the end of November 1994
Complemented the NAFTA accord and gave further credence to the Clinton
administration's goal of economic security
Additional Economic Initiatives
The Clinton administration initiated two additional
efforts in pursuit of its economic security goal
One was directed
toward a "market opening agreement" among the Pacific Rim nations at the
November 1994
APEC meeting in Indonesia
APEC agreed to develop a blueprint of what exactly free trade means
Whether it applies to goods or services or both
They set the target of 2020 to reach the goal
The other effort
was the "Summit of the Americas" conference held in Miami by thirty four
Western Hemisphere
countries in December 1994.
It's aim was to set in motion the creation of a free trade zone throughout
the Americas
The target date agreed upon for completing these talks was set at 2005
(the
actual date for the elimination of all trade barriers was not set)
Promoting Stability and Democracy Abroad: The Problems of China, Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti
China
The search for
economic security versus the promotion of democracy
In order for
China to continue its MFN status, the secretary of state would need to
determine
whether China
had made progress in other areas"
Taking steps to begin adhering to international human rights standards
Releasing and providing an acceptable accounting of political prisoners
Especially those held as a result of the Democracy Wall and Tiananmen Square
movements
Ensuring humane treatment of prisoners
Protecting Tibet's distinctive religious and cultural heritage
Permitting international radio and television broadcasts into China
Bosnia
In April 1992,
a public referendum was held and independence was supported and promptly
declared to
some Bosnian republics
Conflicts arose, due to the the multiethnic, multi religious state of the
ethnic Serbs,
Croats, and Muslims
Fighting broke out, ethnic cleansing began, UN decided to come in (1992)
Three policy
options framed the discussion, about Bosnia, for the next two years for
the
Clinton administration
Seeking a diplomatic solution
Lifting the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims
Engaging in air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs
Congress passed
a resolution in July 1995 calling for a unilateral American lifting of
the arms
embargo against
the Bosnian Muslims to allow them to defend themselves
Cease fore accord
was finally agreed to and signed by the parties on October 5, 1995
After several
weeks of negotiations, the "Dayton Accords" were accepted by the parties
and
were formally
signed on December 14, 1995, in Paris
Provided for the continuance of a Croat-Muslim Federation and a Serb Republic
within
a single Bosnian state, with Sarajevo remaining as the capital and a multiethnic
city.
Somalia
February and
March 1993, the Clinton administration changed the nature of the mission
(Operation Restore
Hope - Bush) by backing a UN Security Council Resolution
The resolution moved it beyond a humanitarian mission to what came to be
called a
"nation building" one
This resolution put U.S. forces under UN command and put them in the business
of
trying to institute a stable government among the competing clans in that
African
nation
Situation deteriorated and violence began
A compromise
resolution was approved requiring all forces to be home by March 31, 1994
The Somalia
case raised questions about the Clinton administration's foreign policy
goals of
promoting democracy
and stability and its ability to conduct effective foreign policy.
Haiti
Clinton's campaign
had promised that it would reverse the Bush administration policy of
forcefully returning
Haitians seeking asylum in the United Stated to Haiti ( this promise was
gone, before
Clinton got inaugurated)
The United Nations,
and the United States achieved some success when an agreement was
signed between
Aristide and Haiti's Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras (Cedras would step
down by October
30, 1993 and Aristide would return to power)
July 1994, the
UN Security Council took the ultimate action allowable: A resolution passed,
with U.S. backing,
a resolution authorizing the use of force to restore democracy
September 15,
1994, President Clinton announced his intention to invade of the military
ruling
Haiti did not
give up power
Clinton sent Carter, Colin Powell and Senator Sam Nunn - to Haiti to attempt
to
negotiate the military leader's departure from power (In the eleventh hour
the group
succeeded)
Promoting Stability and Democracy Abroad: Central Europe, Russia, and the Middle East
Central Europe and Russia
The policy aims
were to make certain that Russia's economic and political reforms were
Encouraged and supported
That other countries in the region stated on a democratic track
That a new and more stable European security arrangement was initiated
Clinton promised
1.6 billion in aid to Russia covering such areas as agriculture, foods
and
medicine, housing,
dismantling nuclear weapons, industrial conversion, and private
investment assistance
Russian government had not met some international conditions for receiving
this aid
Clinton released the funds faster
Clinton administration
steadfastly supported Yeltsin and Russian democracy
Parliament tried to restrict Yeltsin's powers and impeach him
The Middle East
The Clinton
administration initiated an important policy change: it replaced the balance
of
power policy
followed by the Bush administration against Iran and Iraq with a policy
that it
called "dual
containment"
PLO leader Yasir
Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin signed the Israeli-PLO Accord on September 13,
1993
It was successful because Norwegian foreign minister, Jorgen Holst, had
secretly been
holding talks between the two adversaries since April 1992.
It set out a timetable over how the two sides will "share the same living
space"
Reshaping the American Military: The Bottoms-Up Review, the Nuclear
Forces Review, and the
Quadrennial Defense Review
Conventional Force Review
The Bottoms-Up
Review was issued relatively quickly by the administration in October 1993,
and it sought
to be "a comprehensive review of the nations defense strategy, force structure,
modernization,
infrastructure, and foundations"
The core of the report was a call for a change in America's defense strategy
Nuclear Force Review
Nuclear Posture
Review, completed a year later and announced by Aspin's successor at
Defense, William
Perry
Called for dramatic reduction in the nuclear forces of the United States
Guiding principle was to bring U.S. forces in line with the requirements
of the
START II treaty when it was fully implemented
Recommended change for the non strategic or theater component of U.S. nuclear
forces
Recommended that the options of dual capable aircraft on carriers and cruise
missiles
on surface ships be eliminated
Made number of recommendations for maintaining and improving the safety
and
security of America's nuclear arsenal (met with skepticism and lessened
the capability
of the U.S.)
Quadrennial Defense Review
Announced in
May, 1997, similar to the Bottoms Up Review
It sought to begin to implement Joint Vision 2010, a plan developed by
the military on
future operational needs and to set out an approach to meet American defense
needs
through 2015
Called for the further streamlining of the size of the military force and
its infrastructure
Continued to emphasize the need for America's military communication and
technological superiority
Sought military procurement funding for weapons modernization
Committed the military to use available resources more efficiently