Huntingdon
College | Political Science | Courses
| Falklands maps
| What's New?
PSC
321: British Politics
"The Battle of the Falklands /Malvinas, May-June
1982."
summary for undergrads,
revised 17 Jan. 2006 from presentation
July 2003,
by Jeremy
Lewis, Professor of Political Science,
with tenure, Huntingdon College.
Hypotheses:
short term political miscalculation, not grand
strategy, caused battle
developing country met developed country on roughly
equal technological terms
Argentina, 1982: pop. 30 m, income $7,000 per capita.
UK, 1982: pop 60 m, income $21,000 per capita.
differences of expertise, not technology, caused
success in ground war
outcomes indicated consequences of political conflict
without economics
Strategy versus Politics -- on both sides
conflicting claims to sovereignty
United Kingdom's historical limited investiture,
plantation, and support
Argentina's constitutional claim to Malvinas
Questionable strategic value of islands to either
side
UK political concerns:
Conservative government's military budget cuts without
reducing commitments
decolonizing in conflict with self-determination
of small colonial population
implications for other possessions
remoteness (see
maps)
impending reduction of naval forces
Argentina's political concerns:
Peronist revival in junta, ardent nationalism
domestic political dissent, riots, economic recession,
inflation
Falklands population's concerns:
maintenance of colonial status, stubborn resistance
to change
lack of economic development
dependence on communications via mainland Argentina
attrition of females of child-bearing age owing to
small garrison
Initial Attack by Argentina, 2 April 1982
British response, sending flotilla (slide of routes,
distances)
April skirmishes at sea and in South Georgias (slide)
Naval battle begins, with sub sinking cruiser, missile
killing destroyer
May 1982, British landings and Argentine aerial attacks
May British assaults on Darwin & Goose Green
Marches, landings & battle for heights above
Stanley (3 weeks)
Argentine result:
misled by British signals of unwillingness to defend
Malvinas
poor timing of the Argentine invasion, before UK
capability reduced
incomplete political and military planning
British results
hasty departure of HM fleet, improvised planning
of supplies & logistics
amphibious ships hastily returned to active duty
only one UK amphibious brigade improvised successfully
minimal intelligence available until scouting accomplished
second infantry brigade cannibalized, unready till
final battle
diplomatic scramble to win favor of UN, US.
strategy of attacking center of gravity, in tension
with incremental victories
Differentials in diplomacy
by invading, Argentina lost anticolonial advantage
in latin America
Argentina overestimated US support
UK successful with US & at UN despite Latin American
leadership of UN
Differentials in public information
Argentina's over optimistic propaganda soon disproven,
intensified political failure
UK control in theatre over reporters' communications,
factual statements
Similar, moderate levels of technology: naval platforms
and small arms similar
logistics: distances neutralized British advantage
of naval forces
weaponry in improvised roles: guided missiles &
tracked vehicles
major exception: UK nuclear attack submarine
Differentials in Expertise
closest to equality in Argentine air forces and 5th
marines
widest in naval forces, capital ships
Argentine army conscripted, static, lacking patrolling
UK professional army: scouting, patrolling, night
attack, maintenance
Operational and Tactical Innovation
Argentina
air forces adjusted strike tactics daily, lear jets,
Exocet, refuelling
navy used corvettes for scouting, special forces
in invasion
Mistakes:
army failed to counter attack, defend mount Kent,
feed conscripts
navy failed to use capital ships, submarine attacks
United Kingdom
adaptation was required by rapid deployment, reorganization
of forces
extensive use of special forces
STUFT requisitioned ships
adjusted fleet tactics rapidly after attacks
attacked Argentine cruiser flotilla outside TEZ to
hasten battle
moved fleet according to operational needs
amphibious landing in sheltered sound, sacrificing
radar for air defense
used new & adapted weaponry
adjusted tactics to respond to loss of helo-lift
(Snow
cats, landing ships)
long range bombing with daisy-chained tankers, improvised
refuelling
mistakes:
paratroops with inadequate artillery support
Welsh guards landed Bluff Cove in daylight without air
defense.
Military outcomes
250 UK, 1200 Argentine losses, mostly of ground troops
destroyed fighter-bomber strength of Argentine air
forces
one Argentine cruiser and several smaller ships sank,
one submarine beached
two British destroyers, several frigates, one container
ship and helicopters sunk.
Political outcomes
replacement of junta with democratic regime
fortress Falklands, still heavily dependent on communications
re-election of Conservatives in UK, 1983, with historic
majority, cabinet shift to right
reduction of UK forces, naval in particular, continued
British commitments to Belize, Gibraltar and N. Ireland
continued